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The Cities and Local Growth Unit (CLGU), the cross-government unit jointly housed in 
the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) and the Ministry of 
Housing, Communities and Local Government (MHCLG), commissioned Warwick 
Economics & Development (WECD) to undertake a review of the internal institutional 
processes of devolved authorities in England that were established via the devolution 
deals programme. 
The research includes devolved authorities that are Combined Authorities (CAs) with a directly 
elected mayor (i.e. a metro-mayor) as per November 2018, and these are: 
• Cambridgeshire and Peterborough  
• Greater Manchester  
• Liverpool City Region 
• Tees Valley  
• West Midlands  
• West of England  
The study has also included Cornwall Council, as an example of rural devolution, and London 
(the Greater London Authority, the London Assembly and the London Mayor’s Office), as an 
example of mature devolved city region mayoral governance. 
The study presents a theoretical framework for devolution and reviews institutional processes, 
including leadership, strategy and decision making, transparency and accountability, and civic 
engagement, as broad areas where devolution deals are aimed at bringing institutional 
improvements in local governance. 
The research took place between November 2018 and November 2019, and this report 
presents its key findings. These are summarised below. 
The Context for Devolution  
The devolution agenda in England reflects an increased interest by central government to shift 
power from the centre into the hands of local communities to address a range of economic, 
fiscal, social and democratic issues. The introduction of combined authorities and devolution 
deals, agreed between the combined authorities and central government, aim to unlock the 
potential of local economies with a move towards more local accountability.  
In particular, the encouragement for directly elected mayors at combined authority area level, 
reflects the Government’s agenda that devolved institutions with their own local democratic 
mandate should be primarily accountable, for their actions at a local level (e.g. through the 
ballot box), and an individual locally is clearly accountable to citizens, stakeholders, central 
government and Parliament. At the same time, central government continues to be 
 
 
accountable for services it delivers directly, and together with Parliament, central government 
sets the overall framework within which nationally funded services operate. 
Implementing decentralisation necessitates central government and policy makers to consider 
a range of issues. These include the geographical scale that can deliver the desired 
efficiencies and impacts. Another consideration is the split of responsibilities and 
accountabilities between central and devolved authorities. How devolved areas and institutions 
will be financed is also critical for the sustainability and legitimacy of devolution. 
A review of international evidence suggests that different models of decentralisation are in 
place around the world and no single model is superior to others. For example, the review 
shows that successful decentralisation is not confined to cities or metro-regions. It also 
indicates that visible civic leadership is becoming an important feature of major cities and 
decentralised authorities, but cities across the world can thrive with or without a Mayor.  
A Theoretical Framework for Devolution 
Devolution policy (via bespoke individualised deals) to city-regions and sub-national levels 
requires policy levers, regulatory frameworks, and funding and financing processes to be 
steered by national government towards new forms of devolved government in regions and 
localities, and thus enable national government and local areas jointly, to address opportunities 
and challenges at sub-regional level. This joint approach is expected to:   
1. Reduce the gap between the decision makers and communities;  
2. Take advantage of synergies (driving better value for money by linking different funding 
streams such as transport, housing, skills, business support etc.); and  
3. Achieve the above objectives  (‘1’ and ‘2’) by making better use of local intelligence. 
Ultimately, the devolution policy in England in the form of combined authorities and devolution 
deals has been initiated to unlock the potential of local economies, by improving strategic 
governance and decision making across functional economic areas. Figure 1 depicts the 





Figure 1: A Theoretical Framework for Devolution 
 
Implementing Devolution in England  
Good governance requires effective arrangements in scrutiny, audit and transparency to 
ensure delivery of effective accountability and increase public and stakeholder trust in the new 
institutions and approach. 
By design, the metro-mayoral model is currently the predominant model of devolution in 
England. In general, a mayoral combined authority (MCA) has the following three levels of 
power: 
• The directly elected mayor exercising mayoral functions; 
• The MCA Board (or Cabinet) consisting of local authority leaders and the directly 
elected mayor; and 
• The MCA’s overview and scrutiny committees, holding both the mayor and the MCA 
Board to account. 
The consultations undertaken as part of this evaluation and the review of relevant documents 
suggest that, overall leadership and ultimate accountability rests primarily with the metro-
mayors in all MCAs. However, the extent of mayoral powers in strategic planning or decisions 
making varies across MCAs, and the factors that have informed the choice of the metro-mayor 
model in a locality are not always made explicit. 
Views on metro-mayors and their role in devolution are, on the whole, positive in the localities 
where a metro-mayor is present. The main benefits are perceived to be higher visibility of the 
area and clearer accountability in comparison to previous arrangements. In particular, metro-
mayors are seen as already having a positive impact in terms of providing leadership and a 
powerful single voice representing the needs of local communities in areas where the local 
 
 
links with central government may have been fragmented or relatively weak. At the same time, 
some stakeholders see metro-mayors as a political layer imposed by central government in 
exchange for the agreement over a devolution deal, and therefore, representing a devolution 
model that still remains to be tested. 
The consultations with internal key stakeholders indicate that meeting key statutory 
requirements has been the first priority for MCAs, and all devolved authorities currently have 
systems in place that meet legal requirements around overview, scrutiny and audit.  
The research also highlights that, good practice in public scrutiny processes is apparent in pre- 
and post-policy design stages. For example: 
• Cornwall’s current model of local governance has been informed from a range of 
stakeholders and civic engagement. The council also developed a social media 
campaign using #standupforCornwall to generate conversations about its devolution 
deal (alongside a public pledge for residents to sign up to and support devolution).  
• In Greater Manchester, the public contributed to the development of the spatial 
framework – with 30,000 responses received. The Greater Manchester CA also 
recognised that they need to engage more with the community and voluntary sector for 
the preparation of their Local Industrial Industry and the GM Community Voluntary and 
Social Enterprise (GM CVSE) reference group was convened to inform the process and 
the strategy. 
• In London, publicly visible scrutiny exists in the form of Mayoral Question Time. There is 
also a dedicated Community Engagement Team that connects the authority with local 
communities across Greater London. 
• In Liverpool, the Liverpool City Region CA invited PLACED, a local organisation, to 
deliver a series of pop-up events across the city region. These events aim to capture 
local people’s views, as part of the “Our Places” consultation, to influence the Combined 
Authority’s first Spatial Development Strategy (SDS), setting out a strategic framework 
for the development and use of land looking over the next 15 years. 
(Local) assurance frameworks have been prepared by all MCAs (mainly reflecting the MCAs’ 
individual constitutions and the government’s National Local Growth Assurance Framework). 
However, what is understood by the term ‘transparency’ varies considerably among MCAs. 
The consultations with MCA staff and key stakeholders indicate that setting up good 
governance structures has required significant resources. A review of MCAs organisational 
structures indicate that the MCAs’ institutional capacity has not fully evolved as yet; or where 
devolved institutions have been established for a while, a review is needed to ensure that 
organisational structures and capabilities continue to be fit for purpose. At the same time, 
feedback provided during the consultations indicates that support for collaborative working and 
nurturing of partnerships at local level remains embryonic in many areas. Consultations with 
external stakeholders indicate that devolved institutions have not always capitalised on the 
knowledge and expertise that could be provided by the existing staff in constituent authorities 
(e.g. secondments of staff tend to be rare). 
 
 
Public and Business Perceptions  
Two surveys were conducted to establish public and business perceptions of leadership roles 
in local government and devolved institutions. These have included: a) a survey of public 
perceptions – conducting 500 interviews in each devolved authority participating in the study, 
using a panel-based approach; and b) a survey of business perceptions – conducting 150 
interviews in each devolved authority participating in the study.  
Key findings from the two surveys (general public and businesses) are summarised below. 
Reference to specific devolved authorities is made only for descriptive purposes. Any 
comparison between authorities would not be credible, in the light of different contexts and 
structures underpinning these devolved institutions. 
Key Findings: 
• The public survey found that, on average (i.e. across all devolved authorities), a similar 
proportion of public were aware of the terms ‘combined authority’ and ‘local enterprise 
partnership’, that is 46% and 45% respectively. Awareness of the terms of ‘local 
authority’ and ‘chambers of commerce’ was significantly higher at 96% and 86% 
respectively.  
• The business survey indicated that, one average, a larger proportion of business was 
aware of the term ‘local enterprise partnership’ than ‘combined authority’, 64% in 
comparison with 43%. Awareness of the term ‘local authority’ was similar to the general 
public survey (96%) whilst awareness of ‘chambers of commerce’ was higher  (90%).  
• Respondents were asked whether they knew what the term ‘combined authority’ meant. 
Nearly three quarters of general public respondents (73%), across all combined 
authority areas, believed that they knew what the term ‘combined authority’ meant. The 
equivalent figure among business respondents was 70%. 
• Nearly three quarters of general public respondents (72%) across all combined authority 
areas reported that they were aware of who the metro-mayor for their area was. The 
equivalent figure among business respondents was 66%.  
• At the same time, around half the general public respondents disagreed with the 
statement that ‘people are clear about who is responsible for leadership’ in their area 
(around 20% thought that people were clear about who is responsible for leadership and 
the rest were not sure or did not know). Business respondents tended to be much 
clearer about who is responsible for leadership in their area than the general public. 
• In general, specific projects promoted by the combined authority or the mayors are 
relatively well known and mostly supported by the general public and businesses (with 
the level of support varying between businesses and the public depending on the 
project). 
• In the majority of combined authority areas general public respondents indicated that 
their greatest interest was in decisions taken in the region for health and environmental 
issues. Business respondents in the majority of combined authority areas indicated their 




• The surveys found relatively low levels of engagement with information resources 
produced by the combined authority e.g. social media, web pages, council meeting 
minutes or strategic documents. The exception was Cornwall where a relatively higher 
proportion reported engagement with sources of information by the authority.   
• General public respondents were also asked to what extent they agree that too many 
policy decisions affecting their area are made outside it. Respondents in Cornwall 
showed the highest agreement with the statement (64%), while respondents in London 
expressed the lowest level of agreement (33%). 
Summary 
The research underpinning this evaluation was conducted during a period of significant political 
developments in the UK. Most study MCAs were also in the midst of major organisational 
changes. 
Nevertheless, this research has shed more light on specific issues relating to the approach to 
devolution in England and has identified good practice and lessons to be learned from existing 
arrangements as well as issues to considered for the future.  
The literature review and the resulting theoretical model for devolution provide a step forward 
to inform future outcome and impact evaluations of devolution deals by building a more 
detailed picture of the processes by which devolved institutions need to design and implement 
their activities. 
Both the feedback from the consultations and the desk-based review confirm that the 
devolution policy in England has evolved in a fragmented way over time and through different 
pieces of legislation. This often makes devolution to appear confusing, ad hoc and 
asymmetrical to local stakeholders and the public. 
To date, the emphasis of implementation of devolution has been to establish what is required 
by legislation and to commence delivery. Establishing and complying with statutory obligations 
requires significant resources and can be burdensome. Therefore, devolved institutions have 
had very little time to establish systematic routes to external engagement e.g. civic 
engagement. Understanding and interpretation of issues relating to inclusiveness is also 
patchy. In particular, business engagement in decision making and delivery is not always very 
clear, and in some cases, it is limited to key employers in the area (usually larger businesses). 
The research shows that effective implementation of devolution in England will require 
significant support for building up capacity and achieving cultural change at local and central 
government levels. It will also require a simple message and joint effort (by central government 
and devolved institutions) to improve the public’s understanding of what devolution means and 
what benefits it brings.  
Devolved institutions will benefit from a common set of good governance principles. They also 
need to be in a better position to plan long-term without relying on ad-hoc and fragmented 





1.1 The Cities and Local Growth Unit (CLGU), the cross government unit jointly housed in 
the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) and the Ministry of 
Housing, Communities and Local Government (MHCLG), commissioned Warwick 
Economics & Development (WECD) to undertake research and evaluation of the 
internal institutional processes of those devolved authorities in England that were 
established via the devolution deals programme and have a directly elected mayor.  
1.2 The research includes the following devolved authorities that are Combined Authorities 
(CAs) with a directly elected mayor (i.e. a metro-mayor) as per November 2018;1 and 
these are: 
1. Cambridgeshire and Peterborough  
2. Greater Manchester  
3. Liverpool City Region 
4. Tees Valley  
5. West Midlands  
6. West of England  
1.3 The study has also included: 
• Cornwall Council, as an example of rural devolution; and  
• London (the Greater London Authority, the London Assembly and the London 
Mayor’s Office), as an example of mature devolved city region mayoral 
governance. 
1.4 The research has taken place between November 2018 and November 2019, and this 
report presents its findings.  
Remit of the Study 
1.5 To date, monitoring and evaluation provisions for the devolution deals have focused on 
outcomes and impact, and do not consider evaluating institutional processes. This is 
problematic, considering that the policy logic for devolution deals is centered around 
the policymaking and service-delivery advantages of devolved authority institutional 
models. This evaluation, therefore, aims to explore institutional processes, including 
leadership, strategy and decision making; transparency and accountability; and civic 
 
1 The study covers the six combined authorities that held mayoral elections in May 2017. Two more combined 
authorities elected mayors at a later stage: the Sheffield City Region elected a mayor in May 2018 and the North 
of Tyne elected one in May 2019. In addition, there are two more CAs that do not have a directly elected mayor; 
these are the North East Combined Authority and West Yorkshire Combined Authority.  None of these are 
included in this study. 
 
 
engagement, as broad areas where devolution deals are aimed at bringing institutional 
improvements in local governance). 
1.6 Within this context, the key aims of this research are summarised as follows: 
• To produce a theoretical framework that depicts the context and processes 
underpinning and influencing the pathway(s) that lead from the design and 
implementation of devolution at local level, to relatively higher economic and 
social positive changes and impacts, as well as improved delivery effectiveness 
and efficiencies at local level. 
• To examine institutional processes (including strategy and decision making) and 
the nature and extent to which leadership, transparency, accountability and civic 
engagement mechanisms and assurances are embedded in these processes 
(these representing the broad areas where devolution deals are aimed at bringing 
institutional improvements in local governance).  
• To explore some early outcome factors on public perceptions and understanding 
in relation to leadership, transparency, accountability and civic engagement in 
decision- making and implementation of decisions by Mayoral Combined 
Authorities (MCAs).  
• To draw on the evidence collected through desk-based research and 
consultations to illustrate the extent to which the policy aim of improving local 
government institutions has materialised (or is very likely to materialise in the 
near future), and to identify unintended consequences, risks and threats.  
• To inform future outcome and impact evaluations of devolution deals by building 
a more detailed picture of the processes by which these institutions design and 
implement socio-economic interventions.  
Overview of the Study Approach  
1.7 To meet the objectives of the study, a range of tasks have been undertaken. These 
include: 
• Extensive desk-based reviews of: 
o Relevant literature, legislation and policy documents – in relation to devolution 
and local governance (Appendix A provides a list of bibliography reviewed and 
referred to in the report). 
o Devolved authorities’ relevant documentation, e.g. devolution deals, 
organisational diagrams, governance arrangements and various strategic 
documents – accessing both secondary resources of information, and 
documents directly provided by the authorities participating in the study. 
o Data relating to key socio-economic indicators in each area. 
• Informal consultations with key personnel in devolved authorities and constituent 
councils, and key stakeholders, to better understand the implementation, 
management and governance of devolved authorities to inform the development 
 
 
of the theoretical framework. Appendix B provides a list of consultees that have 
participated in this study. 
• A survey of public perceptions – conducting 500 interviews in each devolved 
authority participating in the study (as per the recommendation from BEIS 
analysts), using a panel-based approach. 
• A survey of business perceptions – conducting 150 interviews in each devolved 
authority participating in the study.  
1.8 The business and public surveys have been undertaken by Winning Moves 
(https://www.winningmoves.com). Appendix C describes the survey methodologies.  
1.9 The research underpinning this evaluation was conducted during a period within which 
a number of significant political and administrative changes were happening. These 
included local and national elections, as well as organisational changes within the 
study MCAs. These changes resulted in delays in the consultation process, including 
the WECD research team being given access to internal and external consultees, and 
gaining agreement by the MCAs to conduct the public and business surveys. 
Report Structure 
1.10 The remainder of the report is structured as follows: 
• Section 2 presents an overview of the context underpinning devolution policy in 
the UK. 
• Section 3 presents a theoretical framework for devolution in England – drawing 
upon the literature review and review of policy documents produced on relevant 
matters by central and local government.  
• Section 4 provides feedback on the institutional processes in implementing 
devolved powers drawing upon desk-based reviews of documentation produced 
by the devolved authorities and informal discussions with key staff in the 
authorities. 
• Section 5 presents public and business perceptions of local governance terms 
and key concepts – recognising that some authorities have been in existence 
longer than others. It also presents the main public policy areas that are of 
interest to the public and businesses at local level.  
• Section 6 draws conclusions about the overall benefits of the devolution process 
to date, the extent to which the policy aim of improving local government 
institutions has materialised (or is very likely to materialise in the near future), and 




2 The Context for Devolution Policy in 
England 
2.1 This section provides an overview of the general concepts underpinning devolution 
policy in England. The overview draws upon extensive literature review and key points 
are summarised below. 
Decentralisation is a complex process that can take many forms, depending on the extent 
of transfer of administrative, fiscal and political powers away from the centre. Devolution 
is only one of these forms, and the term is used interchangeably with the term 
‘decentralisation’ to describe the most common understanding of central government 
relinquishing certain functions to sub-national entities, such as regional, sub-regional, and 
local authorities that are legally constituted as separate governance bodies. 
A combination of policy objectives may drive the transfer of authority, responsibility, 
resources and functions from national to sub-national level. However, the key driving 
force behind the decentralisation agenda is the belief that societies are ultimately 
governed more democratically and effectively if decisions can be taken at the closest 
possible level to the communities that they impact. Accountability and democratic 
involvement are also enhanced as policy decision making gets closer to local people, and 
the distance between those in government and their constituencies is reduced. 
Implementing decentralisation necessitates central government and policymakers 
considering a range of issues. These include the geographical scale that can deliver the 
desired efficiencies and impacts. Another consideration is the split of responsibilities and 
accountabilities between central and devolved authorities. How devolved areas and 
institutions are financed is also critical for the sustainability and legitimacy of devolution. 
A review of international evidence suggests that different models of decentralisation are 
in place around the world and no model is superior to others. For example, the review 
shows that successful decentralisation is not confined to cities or metro-regions. It also 
indicates that visible civic leadership is becoming an important feature of major cities and 
decentralised authorities, but cities across the world can thrive with or without a Mayor.  
In England, in recent years, the devolution agenda reflects an increased interest by 
central government to shift power from the centre into the hands of local communities to 
address a range of economic, fiscal, social and democratic issues. The introduction of 
combined authorities and devolution deals, agreed between the combined authorities and 
central government, aim to unlock the potential of local economies with a move towards 
more local accountability.  
In particular, the encouragement for directly elected mayors at combined authority area 
level, reflects the Government’s agenda that devolved institutions with their own local 
democratic mandate are primarily accountable locally for their actions (e.g. through the 
ballot box), and an individual locally is clearly accountable in front of citizens, 
stakeholders, central government and Parliament. At the same time, central government 
continues to be accountable for services it delivers directly, and, together with Parliament, 




Rationale(s) for Decentralisation  
2.2 Decentralisation is a multifaceted concept that concerns the transfer of authority, 
responsibility, resources and functions (any or all of these) from national to sub-
national (local or regional) governments, or the private sector. Since the 1970s, 
decentralisation has been a key component of institutional reform adopted by many 
European and international states (Rodriguez-Pose and Gill, 2003; OECD, 2003; 2005; 
Tomaney et al, 2011; OECD; 2013). Pike et al. (2016) note that:  
“Decentralisation comes in different forms. The extent and nature of 
decentralisation is critical in shaping its potential effectiveness, outcomes and 
impacts. Understanding the different kinds of decentralisation is important in 
assessing the current and potential future changes in England. ‘Devolution’ is 
the term being widely used in this policy area but whether it contains the 
appropriate elements to meet that definition of decentralisation is questionable.” 
(p.9) 
2.3 Pike et al (2016) note that other terms used to describe aspects of decentralisation 
include, for example, deconcentration and delegation as well as devolution (Pike et al., 
2016; Tomaney et al, 2011). 
2.4 Notwithstanding the terminology, the driving force behind the decentralisation agenda 
is the belief that societies will ultimately be governed more democratically and 
effectively if decisions can be taken at the closest possible level to the communities 
that they impact. Theoretical literature sets out three ‘classic rationales’ for 
decentralisation (Tomaney et al, 2011). These are: 
• Allocative efficiencies: the greater efficiency of local allocation of resources to 
match local needs and preferences, including that decision makers are more 
closely connected to the local consequences of their spending decisions; 
• Productive efficiencies: local identification and mobilisation of economic 
potentials; and 
• Accountability and democracy: bringing decision making closer to the citizen and 
local people. Decentralisation reduces the distance between those in government 
and their constituencies. 
2.5 Within this context, decentralisation is ultimately the tool through which central 
government seeks to enhance economic performance, fiscal efficiency and policy 
delivery at both national and local levels. As the OECD (2003) sets out: 
“…through improving local government, governments seek to make their actions 
more coherent locally and enhance their contribution to solving local problems in 
areas falling between individual policy fields” (Managing Decentralisation, 2003, 
p.12) 
2.6 It is this quality of decentralisation that the centre seeks to harness in order to tailor 
policy to the individualities of a region, locality or place and tackle a range of policy 
issues such as: public service inefficiency, skills shortages, economic deprivation and 
infrastructure development. Therefore: 
 
 
“Arguing about whether decentralization should happen is largely irrelevant; the 
way it is implemented will determine how successful it is ... decentralization is 
almost always politically motivated ... [and] ... devising a successful 
decentralization strategy is complex because decision makers do not always 
fully control the decentralization process” (World Bank, 1999: 8-9). 
Decentralisation in England to date 
2.7 The UK is a strong economy. However, the economy is facing some important 
weaknesses in comparison with other major economies including lagging behind in 
productivity, higher skills and innovation. Uneven patterns of economic growth and 
standards of living in different localities and sectors across the country contribute to a 
national picture in need of significant improvements in many socio-economic 
indicators.  
2.8 At the same time, all decisions on anything other than small projects tend to be made 
by Her Majesty’s Government (HMG) (where it is argued it is impossible for ministers 
and officials to know the detailed needs of every city and county in England). Most 
local government revenue comes from central government (53%), with 29% from 
Council Tax (this compares with 62% in Sweden2), 16% from retained business rates 
and the remaining 2% from reserves and other sources. Virtually, all major decisions 
about raising taxation and the distribution of public expenditure are made in 
Westminster and Whitehall. Although Council Tax is the largest source of revenue for 
local authorities after that received from central government, decisions about the 
Council Tax base remain mostly nationally determined.  
2.9 The devolution agenda in the UK in the recent years reflects a desire to address a 
range of economic, fiscal social and democratic issues with a move towards more local 
accountability.  Successive governments may have recognised that economic growth 
in the UK is not balanced, and the situation could become worse within a rapidly 
changing economic and public finance environment. Also, there are already significant 
local and regional economic and social disparities between the best and worst 
performing areas in the country – with the forecasts for future public policy, 
demographic and economic changes more likely to increase than reduce these 
disparities.   
2.10 A review of devolution policy indicates that three primary principles have informed the 
central government’s pursuit of decentralisation to date: 
• Economic growth: including the promotion of local growth, the achievement of 
various versions of spatial and sectoral balance, and fair distributional outcomes 
for all; 
• Better and more integrated public services: more efficient, and better matched to 
local preferences including offering holistic solutions and equity of outcomes; and 
 
2 OECD/UCLG (2019), 2019 Report of the World Observatory on Subnational Government Finance and 
Investment – Key Findings. 
 
 
• Enhanced public engagement and accountability: the promotion of engagement 
and participation as part of a healthy democracy, and being closer to the decision 
makers.  
2.11 The introduction of CAs – and central government encouragement for mayors directly 
elected by the public to lead them – are aimed at addressing these issues. The 
premise is to unlock the potential of local economies – in particular cities – by 
improving strategic governance and decision making across functional economic areas 
with clearer accountability; enabling better spatial tailoring of interventions with local 
knowledge and context and enhancing opportunities for innovation; and exploiting 
economies of scale, and synergies in policy and budget management by strategically 
convening leadership, powers and resources across functional economic geographies. 
2.12 Transfer of powers away from the centre has been relatively slow, and it has focused 
on devolution with reference to the nations rather than cities or regions. London was 
the first city in England to gain greater devolved powers with the Greater London 
Authority (GLA) Act 1999, a directly elected mayor – the Mayor of London – as the 
executive of the GLA, and a separately elected Assembly – the London Assembly.  
2.13 However, until November 2014, when the UK Government and the Greater 
Manchester CA signed a devolution agreement devolving policy powers and 
responsibilities to Greater Manchester, including the adoption of a directly elected 
mayor, there were devolution agreements for the nations of Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland and also for Greater London, but none for any other city or region in 
England.  
2.14 Following the 2015 General Election, the then Chancellor, George Osborne, outlined 
the Government’s approach:  
“Here’s the deal:  
We will hand power from the centre to cities to give you greater control over 
your local transport, housing, skills and healthcare. And we’ll give the levers you 
need to grow your local economy and make sure local people keep the rewards.  
But it’s right people have a single point of accountability: someone they elect, 
who takes the decisions and carries the can.  
So with these new powers for cities must come new city-wide elected mayors 
who work with local councils.  
I will not impose this model on anyone. But nor will I settle for less.”  
(HM Treasury, “Chancellor on Building a Northern Powerhouse”, 14 May 2015) 
2.15 These statements represent a step change in the UK government’s thinking in relation 
to local government, particularly the reference to desired structures to take on 
delegated powers. Previous attempts to devolve decision making to the regions and 
localities (e.g. Regional Development Agencies and Local Enterprise Partnerships) or 
local government (e.g. through the City Deals) did not explicitly refer to the need for an 
appropriate structure to take on the delegated powers, and in particular the need for 
visible, accountable leadership. In the above statements, for the first time, local 
devolution is directly linked to the public directly electing a mayor. 
 
 
2.16 The then Government also indicated that government departments were expected to 
proactively consider devolving powers as stated in the Spending Review 2015: 
“3.15 The government is committed to building strong city regions led by elected 
mayors, building on the ground-breaking devolution deal with Greater 
Manchester in November 2014. The Chancellor has asked all relevant 
Secretaries of State to proactively consider what they can devolve to local areas 
and where they can facilitate integration between public services… 
3.16 As part of the Spending Review, the government will look at transforming 
the approach to local government financing and further decentralising power, 
in order to maximise efficiency, local economic growth and the integration of 
public services.”  
(HM Treasury, Spending Review 2015, A country that lives within its means.) 
2.17 These announcements were complemented by: 
• The inclusion of further powers for Greater Manchester;  
• The announcement of a comprehensive devolution deal for Cornwall; and  
• The Cities and Local Government Devolution Act 20163 that is the enabling 
legislation to transferring budgets and/or powers from central government to local 
authorities (including groups of local authorities i.e. combined authorities) based 
on individual negotiations and agreement between the two levels of government 
over a deal – a bespoke devolution deal. In order for a CA to be transferred 
powers, a metro-mayor must be elected for the area. 
2.18 To date (January 2020), bespoke devolution deals have been agreed in various policy 
areas and to a varying extent with Cambridgeshire and Peterborough, Cornwall, 
Greater Manchester, Liverpool City Region, London, North of Tyne, Sheffield City 
Region, Tees Valley, the West Midlands, the West of England and West Yorkshire. To 
date, Cornwall and West Yorkshire CA are the two areas that have devolution deals 
without having a mayor.  
2.19 Through these deals the UK Government has agreed to devolve4 certain powers to 
localities to deliver (rebalanced) economic growth through more/better levels of local 
accountability, with the specific arrangements varying in each case. At the same time, 
while the specific functions and funding terms of each devolution deal differ, all deals 
include an agreement on devolved responsibility for substantial aspects of transport, 
business support and further education. Other policy areas included in some of the 
deals are housing, planning and land use, and health and social care.  
2.20 Ultimately, it is expected that economic, social and democratic benefits arising from 
these initiatives and reforms should outweigh any costs – including accounting for any 
risks where the net benefits to be gained from spatial governance reform and 
 
3 CAs were introduced in England in the earlier Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 
2009. The legislation provides for greater involvement of local authorities in local and regional economic 
development and makes provision for the purposes of promoting public involvement in relation to local authorities 
and other public authorities [12th November 2009] 
4 Currently, however, there is no legal mechanism for formal devolution of powers to the GLA. Section 39A of the 




devolution of powers/budgets could have been incorrectly assessed.  Furthermore, the 
Government’s view is that, although its programme of decentralisation shifts power 
from the centre into the hands of local communities and individuals, this does not 
mean that central government will devolve all its responsibilities to local bodies, nor 
stop taking an interest in what happens locally. Central government and Parliament will 
continue to set the framework within which nationally funded services operate, even 
where central government is not delivering them directly.5 
2.21 At the heart of this position by central government lies the desire to jointly address 
local issues but also share accountability with devolved institutions for local services – 
with legitimacy of actions taken at local level i.e. as demonstrated by the ballot box. 
Currently, increased demand for devolution by local authorities (as demonstrated by 
the 38 bids submitted to government for devolved powers in 2015), is matched by 
voter turnout in local elections in England that is well below that found in other 
democratic countries.6 
Implementing Decentralisation 
2.22 The previous paragraphs have provided a headline overview of the current approach 
to devolution in England. Implementing decentralisation requires a constant review of a 
range of issues. Delivering inclusive, sustainable, balanced and effective economic 
growth that works for all different localities, in particular within finite (and often 
decreasing) public finances, presents policy makers at national and local levels with a 
number of options.  
2.23 There are three main overarching processes that best capture the transfer of authority, 
responsibility, resources and functions from central government. These are: 
• Fiscal decentralisation: refers to transfer of powers for raising and spending 
public resources; 
• Administrative decentralisation: takes into account decision making authority, 
personnel control, and control over public finances; and 
• Political decentralisation: refers to the degree of independence enjoyed by lower 
tiers of government in performing their typical six main processes (i.e. 
mobilisation, organisation, articulation, participation, contestation, and 
aggregation of interests). 
2.24 Implementing decentralisation necessitates, therefore, central government considering 
a range of issues. One of the most important considerations is to establish an 
appropriate sub-national geographical scale that can deliver the desired efficiencies, 
dividends and accountabilities when central powers are distributed. These can be 
functional economic areas (for such things as labour markets and skills), or local 
constituencies for political representation. Another consideration is how sub-national 
layers of government will be financing their defined areas/economies.  
 
5 DCLG (2011), Accountability: Adapting to Decentralisation. 
6 Across the 28 EU states the average turnout for Parliamentary elections was 66.5%. The UK 2017 General 
Election produced a higher turnout at 68.8% (the highest among EU countries was in Malta at 92.06%) – see 
Turnout at Elections, House of Commons Library, Briefing Paper, Number CBP 8060, 5 July 2019. 
 
 
2.25 None of these issues is easily determined and, in reality, the majority of countries are 
governed by multiple layers of sub-national government and complex systems of fiscal 
arrangements. For example, among OECD countries multiple layers of sub-national 
government (i.e. ‘systems of distributed power’) can be found as follows: 21% of 
OECD countries having one layer, 24% having two layers and the majority of OECD 
countries having three layers of sub-national government (56%).7  
2.26 In general, it is the combination of the following factors that defines the form that 
decentralisation takes in any instance: 
• First, the particular balance or mix of powers and autonomy which may be 
permitted between central and sub-national government;  
• Second, the bureaucratic detail of implementation of such permission; and 
• Third, the broader territorial governance framework (or context) within which any 
decentralisation initiative might sit. 
2.27 Powers and resources may, therefore, be decentralised such that a number of different 
‘distributed power’ forms can emerge, as shown in Figure 2. 
Figure 2: The distribution of power under decentralisation 
 
Source: Pike, A (CURDS, Newcastle University) 
Adapted from an earlier version at Pike, A (2010) Understanding and Measuring the Governance of Local 
Development Policy, OECD, Paris 
2.28 The complexities surrounding decentralisation suggest that there are both benefits and 
potential costs associated with the process. For example, Tomaney et al. (2011) and 
Tomaney (2015) note that decentralisation can enhance the process of local 
governance and local performance including better political accountability of local 
policy makers. The latter will lead to improved political and technical responsibility 
accompanied by better knowledge of local resources and issues. All will ultimately lead 
to considerable efficiency-enhancing effects.   
2.29 As shown in Figure 3, potential negative effects may also arise through the 
decentralisation process. These include enhanced ability of decentralised governance 
to ‘capture’ policy makers and bureaucrats at local level (‘institutional capture’); the 
potentially lower level of skills of the latter at the local level; and, ultimately, inefficient 
outcomes in addressing externalities, service provision and other policy outcomes. 
 
7 OECD (2014), OECD Regional Outlook, Regions and Cities: Where Policies and People Meet. 
 
 
Figure 3: The benefits and costs of decentralisation 
Benefits Costs 
Improved accountability and 
transparency 
Institutional capture 
Context sensitivity Geographically uneven provision of 
basic services 
Incentive for innovation Duplication 
Better co-ordination of regional/local 
actors 
Lack of resources, capacity and 
knowledge 
Source: Tomaney, 2015 
2.30 The literature review has also highlighted a few more issues surrounding 
implementation of devolution. These have informed the development of the theoretical 
framework in the next section and are discussed below. 
The Geography of Decentralised/Devolved Authorities 
2.31 Evidence to date suggests that where cities are given more freedom and autonomy, 
they have responded by being more proactive and innovative. For example, cities have 
to cope with negative effects of urbanisation and spatial disparities, congestion and 
pollution, social issues and distressed areas, but they also have to produce proactive 
actions to improve and sustain their competitiveness position – with more gains 
accrued by being proactive and creating liveable and attractive cities, rather than 
waiting till problems appear8.  
2.32 To date, although the geographical scale of devolved authorities varies, the majority of 
devolution deals tend to be with cities/city regions. The rationale for this lies with cities 
seen as playing a critical role in economic development. In a recent report by Core 
Cities UK9, it is stated that if the core cities performed at the levels of similar cities 
internationally, it would add £100 billion a year to the UK economy. To achieve this, the 
Core Cities Group argues that cities and other places need greater freedom to unlock 
their potential, in a way that delivers mutual benefits for surrounding areas.  
2.33 Evidence from across the world indicates that well-managed cities provide economies 
of scale, attract talent and a range of skills needed in an economy, and bring people 
together in economic, cultural and learning activities supporting more opportunities for 
interaction, communication and debate – that ultimately facilitate socio-economic, 
spatial, political and technological innovation and advancement. Therefore, the 
association of devolution deals in England with mainly city/metro regions is 
 
8 Competitive Cities in the Global Economy, OECD, 2006. 
9 A network of eight cities in England that advocate devolution of greater powers: Birmingham, Bristol, Leeds, 
Liverpool, Manchester, Newcastle and Nottingham. 
 
 
understandable, but at large it ignores polycentric regions/areas, in particular where 
there is no predominant city, or the functional economic area consists of a mix of urban 
and rural areas. 
2.34 Economic success is definitely not synonymous with one or the other type of 
geography. Negative externalities, socio-economic inequalities, the adverse impacts of 
climate change and lack of action, and poor-quality infrastructure can be found in both 
metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas. Non-metropolitan areas i.e. areas that 
include deep rural areas, towns and villages and coastal communities, also play a vital 
role in the functioning of urban local economies – in England, these non-metropolitan 
areas are the places where half the population live, businesses survive at higher rate, 
and where major visitor attractions are found. 
2.35 IPPR, the Institute for Public Policy Research, argues that there is a strong case to be 
made for devolving to England’s county areas, as follows:  
“Counties cover 86 per cent of the landmass of England and represent half of 
the country’s population, and collectively they represent a sizeable proportion of 
the national economy, However, county economies face significant challenges: 
not least low productivity, relatively low wages, high levels of benefit claimants 
on ESA among those on out of work benefits and large levels of skills 
mismatches. Devolving significant new powers for economic development 
should help counties to address these issues and boost the national economy.  
Beyond their economic potential, counties also have huge opportunities for 
public service reform, delivering more efficient services and better value for 
money. With significantly higher proportions of older people than is the case in 
cities, counties are facing bigger health and social care challenges than other 
parts of the country and costs of service delivery that are much greater in more 
isolated and rural parts.” 
(Empowering Counties, IPPR, Unlocking County Devolution Deals, 2015.) 
2.36 Furthermore, in terms of efficiency, the OECD report10 states that “Duplication of tasks 
is more likely an issue for metropolitan areas than it is for rural areas”. 
Fiscal Autonomy 
2.37 How devolved areas and institutions are financed is critical for the legitimacy and 
sustainability of devolution in the long-term. There is already a large volume of 
literature on how public spending is raised and distributed in the UK and whether this 
represents a fair distribution between central government and local government and 
also between various local authorities.11 Central government remains responsible for 
UK fiscal policy, macroeconomic policy and funding allocation. One justification for this 
level of centralisation is that central government redistributes revenues and 
expenditure across the country ensuring that the needs of those with less revenue-
 
10 Competitive Cities in a Global Economy, OECD, 2017. 
11 One of the most recent comprehensive documents is a report produced by the British Academy for the 
Humanities and Social Sciences. British Academy for the Humanities and Social Sciences, ‘Governing England: 
Devolution and funding’, July 2018. 
 
 
raising assets are met, and any reduction in the redistribution undertaken by central 
government would risk exacerbating inequality among the various localities.  
2.38 Local authorities, academics and political commentators have argued that devolution 
of responsibilities and powers requires central government ensuring that devolved 
institutions also have the financial means they need to meet the economic needs of 
their areas and plan for growth in the long-term. Organisations, such as the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), have also called for further decentralisation to allow 
greater responsiveness to the economic needs of areas and meeting the 
responsibilities devolved to them. As stated by the IMF,  
“…fiscal centralization is high in the UK relative to other countries. A greater role 
for local decision making has the potential to better tailor policies to local 
economic conditions, if equalization mechanisms are in place to ensure that the 
subnational governments have adequate resources to meet the responsibilities 
devolved to them.” 
(IMF, United Kingdom, Article iv Consultation – Press Release; Staff Report; 
Staff Statement; and Statement by the Executive Director for the United 
Kingdom, November 2018.) 
2.39 More local fiscal autonomy in the form of tax-raising powers and retention of local 
taxes (e.g. business rates) for local authorities were announced in 2015.12 The change 
to retained business rates is intended to incentivise areas to grow their tax base, and 
to become less reliant on central government for their revenue. At the same time, on 
average, local government spending on services has fallen by 21% in real terms since 
2009/10 (with cuts been larger in more deprived than more affluent areas).13 This 
means that revenues from council tax and business rates will be the only main source 
of income for local authorities in the future). However, not all local areas are the same 
in terms of their ability to raise revenue (due to, for example, structural differences, 
different starting position, capacity etc.), nor have the same local needs (and 
aspirations in terms of growth).  
2.40 In the light of uneven needs, resources and priorities across England, planned 
changes in the way that local government is funded, the exit of the UK from the 
European Union, and the increasing calls for devolving more powers to local 
government, central government recognises that providing councils with the freedom to 
use funding in a way that responds to local needs and priorities is key to ensuring 
financial sustainability and sound financial management.14 
Civic Leadership 
2.41 In the UK, a directly elected mayor and a cabinet is one of three different ‘political 
management arrangements’ available to local authorities: the others are a leader and 
cabinet, and the traditional ‘committee system’, where decisions are made by policy 
 
12 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/chancellor-unveils-devolution-revolution. 
13 Institute for Fiscal Studies, Neil Amin Smith and David Phillips: English Council Funding: What’s Happened and 
What’s Next? Briefing Note, May 2019. 
14 Government response to the Housing, Communities and Local Government Select Committee report ‘Local 
Government Finance and the 2019 Spending Review’; Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for 
Housing, Communities and Local Government by Command of Her Majesty, October 2019, Response 24 to 
Recommendation 5, page 6. 
 
 
committees and approved by full council.15 In England, elected mayors were first 
established following the election of the Mayor of London in 2000. The Local 
Government Act 200016 made it possible to set up mayors in other local authorities. 
Initially, an elected mayor could only be created following a referendum in favour in the 
relevant local authority. Since 2007, English local authorities have also been able to 
create an elected mayor by resolving to do so. 
2.42 The concepts of accountability and democracy supporting decentralisation (see 
paragraph 2.4) do not explicitly require or define the need for an elected leader as the 
single point of accountability or responsibility. However, evidence from around the 
world indicates that visible civic leadership appears to becoming an important feature 
of major cities.  
2.43 For example, the decision in recent years to adopt directly elected mayors in Toronto 
and other places (particularly in Germany and Italy) appears to be a trend that has 
evolved in parallel with efforts to increase global promotion and regeneration by 
cities/places. In Japan, mayors have significant political kudos and power, and in some 
cases turnout for mayoral elections top that of national polls. The powers vested in the 
mayor as political and organisational head of the municipality afford them considerable 
control over the local authority; in principle, the Japanese system gives mayors broad 
authority to make and implement policy, even in the absence of support from the 
legislative assembly.17 
2.44 The international evidence also suggests that different cities have adopted different 
models of decentralised leadership and that no one model is superior to the others. 
Appendix D provides a few examples of these. Moreover, cities across the world can 
thrive without a directly elected mayor. A review of the international evidence suggests 
that: 
• In local governments across the world there is huge variation in the way powers 
are distributed between the Executive and the Assembly.18 
• No single system or model provides a simple solution to the problems of 
achieving improved competitiveness, social cohesion and environmental 
sustainability. But there are good and bad features of existing arrangements that 





17 Tsuji, Y., Explaining the Increase in Female Mayors: Gender-Segregated Employment and Pathways to Local 
Political Leadership, Social Science Japan Journal Vol. 20, No. 1, pp 37-57, 2017. 
18 Hambleton, Robin (2016), Professor of City Leadership, University of the West of England, English Devolution 
Learning Lessons from International Models of Sub-National Governance. 
19 Competitive Cities in a Global Economy, OECD, 2017. 
 
 
3 A Theoretical Framework for Devolution  
3.1 This section presents a theoretical framework of devolution in England drawing on the 
discussion presented in the previous section.  
3.2 Figure 4 (see page 34) depicts this overarching theoretical framework for devolution in 
local government. Setting out the context and rationale, it describes the 
implementation of devolution in England, through a series of processes and the 
subsequent expected pathways to positive economic and social changes and impacts, 
as well as improved delivery effectiveness and efficiencies. Individual components of 
the framework are discussed in more detail below (including indicators that can be 
used to assess processes and benefits).  
Context and Rationale 
3.3 As discussed in the previous section, the devolution policy in England in the form of 
combined authorities and devolution deals has been initiated to unlock the potential of 
local economies, by improving strategic governance and decision making across 
functional economic areas. Drawing on the previous discussion, the context and 
rationale for these interventions can be summarised as follows:  
• Context: Evidence suggests that societies are ultimately governed more 
democratically and effectively if decisions can be taken at the closest possible 
level to the communities that they impact. Government in the UK (including 
England) is highly centralised, with a trend of decreasing voter turnout at local 
elections, but increasing demand for devolved powers by local government. This 
is coupled with large-scale continuous uneven growth and development, 
manifested by lower levels of productivity, wealth and social mobility in many 
localities, cities and regions.  
• Rationale for devolution deals: Devolution in England is seen as a mechanism 
to address the dislocation between citizens, local communities, and the decisions 
taken by national government in Whitehall and its agencies at local level, for a 
range of economic, social and environmental investments and policy priorities. As 
some powers are decentralised and responsibilities and budgets move away from 
the centre, new ways of organising public services at local level will need to be 
devised to accommodate both strong local and central accountability.  
• Devolution policy (via bespoke individualised deals) to city-regions and sub-
national levels therefore requires policy levers, regulatory frameworks, and 
funding and financing processes to be steered by national government towards 
new forms of devolved government in regions and localities, and thus enable 
national government and local areas jointly to address opportunities and 
challenges at sub-regional level. This approach is expected to:   
1. Reduce the gap between the decision makers and communities (leading to the 
creation of directly elected mayors, accountable to local communities);  
 
 
2. Take advantage of synergies (driving better value for money by linking 
different funding streams such as transport, housing, skills, business support 
etc.); and  
3. Achieve (1) and (2) by making better use of local intelligence.  
Inputs 
3.4 As discussed in paragraphs 2.11–2.18, CAs and devolution deals represent the key 
mechanism of implementing devolution policy in England in recent years. As noted in 
paragraph 2.17, the enabling legislation relating to transfer of powers from central 
government to local levels is the Local Democracy, Economic Development and 
Construction Act 2009, amended by the Cities and Local Government Devolution Act 
2016. According to this legislation, budgets and powers from central government can 
be transferred to local authorities, including groups of local authorities, i.e. CAs. This 
transfer is based on individual negotiations and agreement between the two levels of 
government over a deal – a bespoke devolution deal. 
3.5 CAs are corporate entities, created voluntarily and are formally established by the 
Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government through a Parliamentary 
Order following the request or consent of the councils concerned. There are two main 
types of CAs: those with a devolution deal and hence a metro-mayor for the area 
covered by the CA (the MCAs), and those that do not have a mayor.  
3.6 CAs are made up of constituent and non-constituent authorities. Constituent authorities 
have full voting rights in decision making. It is the decision of the CA whether 
constituent or non-constituent members have a full vote. 
3.7 There are no legal provisions for CAs to be created in Wales, Scotland or Northern 
Ireland, or in London. As discussed in paragraph 2.19, the Mayor of London and the 
Greater London Authority are established by separate legislation. 
3.8 Any proposal for a CA must, according to the legislation, meet tests which highlight its 
ultimate goals as follows20: 
• The first test is to establish whether the creation of the CA is ‘likely to improve the 
exercise of [those] statutory functions in the area or areas concerned’.  
• The second test is captured in the duty on the Secretary of State to have regard 
to the identities and interests of local communities and the need to ‘secure 
effective and convenient local government.’  
3.9 Evidence and academic work indicate that for the theoretical framework to work i.e. 
decentralisation to deliver the intended positive impacts, a number of conditions need 
to be met at this very early stage, and some of these are listed in the framework. One 
of the key conditions is clarity about the actual extent and nature of decentralisation 
based on the following three principles: 
 
20 LGA (May 2016), Combined Authorities, A Plain English Guide. 
 
 
• Legal standing for devolved authorities – so that the legal position of all involved 
is clear and secured particularly when splitting responsibilities between central 
government and devolved authorities, and allocating accountability.  
• Subsidiarity – with central government and devolved authorities regularly 
reviewing which decisions can be made closer to the people affected. 
• Fiscal autonomy – with a move towards a self-sustaining financial system at local 
level; greater fiscal autonomy (e.g. starting with fiscal retention) at local or sub-
regional level will enable more places to invest in the infrastructure needed to 
unlock growth and deliver modern public services. 
3.10 These principles also appeared in a paper published by the Local Government 
Association (LGA) soon after the general election in 201521, the Local Government 
Association outlined why devolution matters and how devolution policy can be 
strengthened. Based on work with its sister organisations in Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland (COSLA, WLGA and NILGA), the LGA set these principles to ensure 
that devolution delivers better outcomes for people and places. 
Process Activities 
3.11 The following broad structures are expected in each devolved institution: 
• Visible leadership (democratically elected) – supported by relevant administrative 
and communication functions, and advisory arrangements. 
• Clarity of leadership roles and accountability responsibilities (political and 
corporate) supported by governance structures that reflect compliance but are 
also simplified and flexible pathways to achieving the desired results.   
• Capacity and adequate resourcing to take on the devolution deal- including 
appropriate governance structures. 
• Scrutiny, transparency and accountability systems in place in decision making 
and delivery – as a minimum, meeting statutory requirements. 
• Civic engagement – systems in place to ensure that the public is engaged, feeds 
back and that their views are considered. 
• Access to reliable intelligence and foresight capabilities. 
3.12 Evidence and academic work indicate that for the theoretical framework to work i.e. 
deliver the intended positive impacts, a number of assumptions/conditions need to be 
met, and some of these are listed in the logic mapping that has informed this 
theoretical framework, and is included in Appendix E of this document. In particular, 
the key features that would increase the likelihood of devolution success include: 
• Clarity around division of responsibility between local authorities, the combined 
authority and the civic leader, e.g. the directly elected mayor. 
 
21 LGA, DevoNext, English Devolution: Local Solutions For A Successful Nation, May 2015. 
 
 
• Minimising displacement or unnecessary substitution of resources, and balancing 
timely and streamlined decision making, based on high-trust relationships of 
informal networks, and governance with reliance and trust on traditional, more 
formal administrative structures, and the production of guidance and clarity 
around procedures.  
• Monitoring, and formative and summative assessment of capacity to take on and 
implement a deal, and also what works, and how the findings from monitoring and 
evaluation of processes and projects/programmes implemented feed back to the 
process and activities. 
• Openness and transparency at all stages, including at the deal negotiation stage, 
but also agreements on programmes and projects to be funded and choices 
made. 
• Public engagement (including citizens, businesses, the third sector) in the 
preparation of devolution proposals, insofar as possible during the negotiations, 
and once the results of a deal have begun to make an impact; these should be 
communicated throughout the process.   
• Access to well-evidenced/triangulated and inclusive baseline information and 
mapping out relevant stakeholders, for continuous, regular and meaningful 
engagement and participation, and ultimately, the simplification of pathways for 
policies reaching their intended beneficiaries.  
3.13 Examples of the evidence that could demonstrate clarity in this area include: 
• Clear and well-documented structures, clarifying roles and responsibilities to 
show who is to be held to account. 
• Published performance measures (and progress against these).  
• Assessment of performance. This could be, for example, through annual reports 
to show progress (both failures and successes). 
• Local scrutiny of devolved activities (and publication of results) through high 
visibility of the work of oversight and scrutiny committees as well as public 
consultations to enable challenge and scrutiny. 
• Setting out clearly the complaints procedures for the public, including in non-
constituent councils. 
• Organisational structures that provide capabilities, expertise, capacity and 
stability aligned to strategic priorities, while enabling both introduction and testing 
of innovative policies, and integrated (rapid) delivery to market intermediaries and 
ultimate beneficiaries. 
• An appropriate assurance framework to provide assurance that there are systems 
in place to ensure impartiality, inclusivity, transparency, and accountability in 
decision making and delivery. 
• Empowerment of constituent members through meaningful engagement and 
sharing of expertise and networks (e.g. avoid duplication of roles, capitalise on 
local knowledge and understanding). 
 
 
• Regular engagement with key local civic and business organisations. 
• Transparent and customised provision of information for publicly funded projects 
and decisions in the public domain. In particular: 
o The public needs to be effectively informed of changes to local governance 
and devolved powers; 
o The public is aware of who is responsible for decision making in different 
devolved powers; 
o Taxpayers understand who is spending their money, how that money is 
allocated and where responsibility lies if the system fails to deliver good value 
or things go wrong; and 
o Information is published in a format that permits it to be used easily by 
members of the public. 
• Up to date, inclusive and comprehensive local intelligence and foresight data. 
• Systematic self-assessment and independent reviews (not only of projects and 
programmes but also organisational structures and performance). 
Expected Outputs and Outcomes 
3.14 Processes and systems in place would lead to the following outputs: 
• (Production of) Strategy/ies with traction (influence and leverage), joint bidding 
and aligned expenditure. 
• (Development of) Integrated services for addressing complex social issues such 
as poverty, homelessness and job opportunities. 
• Coordinated action to tackle environmental issues. 
• Sound spatial planning and more eco-friendly approaches to transport planning 
and urban growth. 
• More organisations, business and citizens enquiring about public services, 
participating in public engagements (and ultimately benefitting). 
• Increased capacity and expertise at sub-regional/combined authority level 
(leading to better use of information, analysis and bespoke polices and delivery). 
3.15 Delegating powers away from central government is expected to have positive 
outcomes including more efficient, targeted, spending of public money as a result of 
better-informed policymakers and greater trust in democratic institutions, enhanced 
civic participation and accountability in local strategic planning. Outcomes to be 
generated in the medium-term would include: 
• Improved strategic governance and decision making. 
• Better spatial tailoring of interventions (utilising local knowledge). 
• Better/faster identification and mobilisation of local productive resources. 
 
 
• More efficient allocation of resources to match local needs and preferences. 
• Exploiting economies of scale, and synergies in policy and budget management 
by strategically convening leadership, powers and resources across functional 
economic geographies. 
• Better place-branding. 
• More coordinated, accessible and visible public services for the general public 
and businesses. 
• Close knitted networks of engagement with business and civic organisations. 
• Increased public scrutiny (in turn leading to continuously improving public service 
offer and delivery models). 
• (Increased) Legitimacy and credibility of the CA within and across stakeholders 
and partnerships. 
3.16 Examples of indicators to assess progress and benefits arising from these outcomes 
and outputs could include: 
• Resources (finance and in-kind) committed by/between constituent members 
(more, shared, seconded). 
• Resources leveraged outside the combined authority. 
• Joined up/integrated thematic strategic frameworks - clearly showing the links 
between health, education, housing, social mobility and economic prosperity. 
• Metrics jointly established by all constituent members to reflect performance of 
the MCA and satisfaction by local citizens, e.g. (increased) local contributions to 
fund specific locally-delivered public services. 
• Public awareness of the Civic Leader and MCA offer (increase over time). 
• Profile of citizens and businesses enquiring about the authority and participating 
in fora, committees, working groups (including from areas less represented and 
groups harder to reach). 
• Public satisfaction (including business) with the services offered (improved). 
• (Increased) Democratic involvement through participation in local elections. 
Impacts 
3.17 CAs aim to improve the delivery of public services and other public functions across 
the area concerned. They achieve these by improving strategic governance and 
decision making across functional economic areas with clearer accountability, by 
enabling better spatial tailoring of interventions with local knowledge and context and 
enhancing opportunities for innovation, and by exploiting economies of scale, and 
synergies in policy and budget management by strategically convening leadership, 
powers and resources across functional economic geographies. 
 
 
3.18 The expected ultimate impacts from devolution reflect the rationale for decentralisation 
described in paragraph 2.10. These include: 
• Economic growth: including the promotion of local growth, the achievement of 
(versions of) spatial and sectoral balance, and fairer distributional outcomes; 
• Better public services: more efficient, better matched to local preferences, 
including equity of outcomes; and 
• Enhanced public engagement and accountability: the promotion of engagement 
and participation as part of a healthy democracy and being closer to the decision 
makers. 
3.19 Economic impacts will need to go beyond the standard economic indicators such as 
Gross Value Added (GVA) and productivity. More jobs for local people and more or 
better performing local businesses across a range of sectors may require time to 
materialise, but they remain key drivers of local economic development and growth.  
3.20 At the same time, processes put in place by devolved institutions should be leading to 
better quality and diverse provision of local infrastructure (beyond national or intra-
regional projects) including housing affordability and connectivity (transport and digital) 
for all – supported by local evidence, and powered by bespoke, flexible to use (larger) 
investment packages.  
3.21 Economic growth and development (prosperity) may (inadvertently) over time lead to 
higher housing prices (through increased confidence in the local markets). Young 
people and those who do not own a house would be mostly impacted, and this will 
need to be monitored to avoid unintended disbenefits. 
3.22 Going further, the UK2070 Commission’s second report22 states that the spatial 
variations in economic performance across the UK can no longer be explained away 
simply in terms of industrial structure, nor solved by the attraction of external 
investment. A wider set of local economic factors need to be explored, as these are 
critical to the localities’ relative performance and enhanced resilience to economic 
shocks and change (such as skill levels, connectivity, local services and environmental 
conditions). For example, the report suggests that it is important to take into account 
and support the foundational economy. This refers to the set of economic activities that 
meet the basic requirements of civilised life for all citizens, irrespective of their income 
and location. It includes material infrastructure – pipes and cables and utility 
distribution systems for water, electricity, retail banking, etc. – and providential services 
– education, health, dignified eldercare and income maintenance. It embraces 
activities that are neither easily tradeable nor exportable.  
3.23 Social impacts should emerge from better coordination of foundational activities and 
could include improved individual well-being, social mobility, earnings, education, 
health and reduced gaps in distribution of incomes locally. 
3.24 Ultimately, the success of any sub-national governance reform largely depends on the 
public support that the new established structure is able to gain and increased 
 
22 UK2070 Commission, An Inquiry into Regional Inequalities Towards a Framework for Action, Fairer and 
Stronger, Rebalancing the Economy, Moving Up the Gears, the Seven National Priorities for Action, 9/2019. 
 
 
confidence and trust in local politics and democratic institutions. New structures and 
processes should also lead to better and more efficient allocation of public funds. 
3.25 Going forward, in addition to the key objectives of decentralisation described above, 
one more potential objective for devolution should be considered – the environment. 
Devolution can play a vital role in promoting sustainable development, and the creation 
of more sustainable patterns of living. Devolved institutions can promote sound spatial 
planning of metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas, and a more eco-friendly 
approach to, for example, transport planning and urban growth management.23 
3.26 Key conditions for the ultimate success of devolution would be: inclusivity, i.e. 
alignment of responsibilities and accountabilities with needs and preferences of all 
(groups) citizens and business in a functional economic area; access to same high 
quality of public services across all localities in an of devolved authority; and alignment 
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4 Implementing Devolution in England  
4.1 This section presents the findings of the review of the internal institutional processes 
that underpin implementation of devolution deals in England to date. The research has 
focused on processes surrounding strategy design and decision making in 
implementing devolution deals with a focus on leadership, accountability, transparency 
and civic engagement. These principles represent the broad areas through which 
devolution deals aim to bring institutional improvements in local governance.  
4.2 Key overarching findings from this research are summarised below: 
Both the feedback from the consultations and the desk-based review confirm that the 
devolution policy in England has evolved in a fragmented way over time and through 
different pieces of legislation. This often makes devolution appear confusing, ad hoc and 
asymmetrical to local stakeholders and the public. 
The consultations also indicate that the majority of constituent members across all 
devolved authorities recognise that devolved institutions are delivering much needed 
cohesive strategic planning across local authority borders, reducing overlap and wasted 
resources, and sharing good practice.  
A desk-based review of key socio-economic indicators in each area suggests that each 
devolved authority is addressing issues that require integrated services and cooperation 
across boundaries to ensure sustainable economic growth and resilience to economic 
changes. These issues go beyond transport and spatial planning and could include high 
levels of underemployment, poor housing affordability, lower productivity and poor 
general infrastructure. 
By design of the devolution policy in England, the metro-mayoral model currently 
dominates civic leadership among devolved authorities. However, the extent of powers of 
mayors in strategy design and decision making varies. Views on directly elected metro-
mayors and their role in devolution are, on the whole, positive in the localities where a 
metro-mayor is present, with the main benefits perceived to be higher visibility of the area 
and clearer accountability.  
The consultations with internal key stakeholders indicate that meeting key statutory 
requirements has been the first priority for all devolved authorities, and all devolved 
authorities have in place systems that meet legal requirements. The research also shows 
that, in general, public scrutiny processes are more common at post-policy design stages.  
However, good practices of stakeholder and public engagement in pre-policy design 
stages also exist. 
The consultations with MCA staff and key stakeholders indicate that setting up good 
governance structures require significant resources and may often result in delays in 
implementation of policies and reaching beneficiary groups. 
At the same time, the research shows that, in a relatively short period of time, CAs have 
produced pan-regional strategic documents built on consensus and local evidence. 
According to the consultations and desk-based reviews, the process of preparing these 
has been a resource intensive exercise but is happening relatively faster than in the past 
e.g. production of Regional Spatial Strategies. 
 
 
Review of MCAs organisational structures indicate that the MCAs’ institutional capacity 
has not fully evolved as yet or, where devolved institutions have been established for a 
while, a review is needed to ensure that organisational structures and capabilities 
continue to be fit for purpose. 
Moreover, feedback provided during the consultations indicates that support for 
collaborative working and nurturing of partnerships with constituent members and other 
local stakeholders remains embryonic in many areas. Devolved institutions have not 
always capitalised on the knowledge and expertise that could be provided by the existing 
staff in constituent authorities e.g. secondments of staff tend to be rare. 
4.3 The evidence supporting these findings is discussed in more detail below. The 
devolution framework has been used to review and assess processes in place. 
However, as devolution deals are only in their early stages of implementation and 
socio-economic impacts take longer to materialise, the discussion focuses on the left-
hand side of the logic model, i.e. activities and processes in place. 
4.4 The MCAs are also relatively new entities and a lot of organisational changes were 
happening while the research was taking place. Nevertheless, good practice, benefits 
and risks from existing arrangements have been identified and highlighted in this 
section. The research findings presented in this section draw on three main sources of 
information:  
• The first one is the formal and informal discussions with key stakeholders in the 
devolved authorities that have been part of this study.  
• The second source is the documented evidence that has been either provided by 
the authorities (or, it has been independently accessed by the research team) to 
demonstrate the nature and extent of leadership by the MCA, accountability, 
scrutiny, transparency and civic engagement.  
• The third one comes from national data sources that have been used to depict 
the latest socio-economic profile of the CA areas. 
Mechanisms for Devolving Powers  
4.5 Both the consultation process and the desk-based reviews have provided feedback on 
the key principles and mechanisms underpinning the decentralisation process through 
the devolution deals, i.e. the inputs in the devolution framework in Figure 4. 
Legislation  
4.6 Legislation is a key enabler of public reforms and, as noted in paragraph 3.9, clarity 
about the legal standing for devolved authorities is necessary to ensure buying in from 
both local stakeholders and the public. Legislation also is important in assigning 
responsibilities and accountability among legally constituted entities. Both the feedback 
from the consultations and the desk-based review confirm that the devolution policy in 
England has evolved in a piecemeal way over time and through different pieces of 
legislation. This makes devolution appear confusing, ad hoc and often asymmetrical, 
as stated during the consultations, in particular in Cornwall and London. 
 
 
4.7 For example, as discussed in section 2 of the report, the core legislation underpinning 
current arrangements for MCAs in England is the Cities and Local Government 
Devolution Act 2016. However, currently there is no legal mechanism for formal 
devolution of powers to the GLA. Section 39A of the GLA Act 1999 permits the 
delegation of ministerial functions to the Mayor, subject to certain limitations and 
conditions.  
4.8 This has led to different approaches when it comes to delegation of certain powers 
such as those surrounding skills and the Adult Education Budget (AEB). In this case, 
as stated in a briefing paper by the House of Commons Library:  
“…in contrast to the MCAs’ ability to treat this grant as part of their ‘single pot’, 
the grant letter to the Mayor of London includes a provision ring-fencing the AEB 
grant to the purposes of the grant or related purposes, and a provision 
permitting unspent funds to be reclaimed by the Government unless they are 
earmarked for future years’ AEB spending. A Memorandum of Understanding 
between the Government and the six MCAs was published in January 2019. In 
contrast to the Mayor of London, this MoU states that “the Department will aim 
to transfer the relevant budget, as a Section 31 … grant, via the ‘Single Pot’ or 
any subsequent, replacement arrangement, to the CA in April each year.”  
(Devolution to local government in England, Mark Sandford, House of 
Commons Library, Briefing Paper, Number 07029, 15 May 2019.) 
4.9 Cornwall was the first local authority to secure a devolution deal in July 2015 without 
being a combined authority nor having a mayor. Feedback provided from internal and 
external consultations suggests that, as a direct result of the devolution deal, a range 
of benefits has been already generated. These include strengthening of partnerships 
and increased cooperation between the Cornwall Council and other authorities (e.g. 
Isle of Scilly) and key stakeholders (e.g. NHS), including the establishment of the 
Cornwall and Isles of Scilly Leadership Board, chaired by the Leader of the Council 
and consisting of a range of local partners, and also £2.3 million savings as a result of 
a more coordinated management of the authority’s estate. The authority is also 
committed to double devolution, meaning transferring powers over community assets 
to local communities, with over 300 devolved to local communities.24 
4.10 At this stage, however, it is not very clear whether and how a new deal, comparable to 
the 2015 Cornwall devolution deal, can be agreed between Cornwall Council (and its 
partners) and the government or, whether the approach that central government has 
adopted with Cornwall can be replicated in/by other areas in England.   
4.11 As some of those consulted have noted, the approach adopted to date to implementing 
devolution in England offers some flexibility. In general, however, those consulted 
agree that consistency and clarity is required. As stated during the consultations:  
“In order for progress to be made [with regards to devolution in England], the 
government must define the purpose of the devolution agenda and devolve 
responsibility, as well as funds, in accordance with this definition; it is also 
important to ensure a roughly symmetrical constitutional settlement for clarity in 
the eyes of the public. …Clarity in both functional and financial powers is crucial 
 
24 Cornwall Devolution Impact Assessment, Cornwall Council, Cornwall Council and Isle of Scilly LEP, NHS 
Kernow Clinical Commissioning Group, January 2019. 
 
 
to allow devolved institutions to be well-run and provide foundations for better 
long-term planning.” 
“Devolution is becoming increasingly crucial as a form of government as 
national administrations ‘simply cannot’ keep pace with societal changes, 
though it is also vital for the agenda that clarity exists over what powers are 
devolved and with which bodies responsibilities rest.” 
Devolution Deals  
4.12 The concept of devolution deals is seen as game changing for local government by all 
those consulted. The consultations also provided feedback with regards to devolution 
deals including their coverage and local authority collaborations underpinning their 
design and delivery.  
4.13 All devolution deals to date have some standard (i.e. common) elements i.e. providing 
devolved powers on planning and strategy for regional transport, economic 
development, business support and skills training, but they vary in the nature and 
extent of devolved powers and budgets they have received under the devolution deals 
and which have been agreed with central government. These differences mainly arise 
as a result of the different needs and priorities in each area in their pursuit of economic 
growth.  
4.14 The feedback from the consultations is positive about variations in devolution deals. 
The vast majority of those consulted believe that variations reflect the individuality of 
the communities they represent; this is seen as the correct approach going forward. 
The central government rationale to permit transfer of powers only on a handful of 
issues, however, has been questioned by all. As stated during one consultation:  
“…devolved institutions are closer to many issues impacting the areas in which 
these authorities hold power …and as relatively new organisations, they are 
better run than the civil service.” 
“…local decision making is important for things that do not appear to be a major 
priority for Government at national level…” 
4.15 A National Audit Office (NAO) report looking into the progress in setting up combined 
authorities states that devolution deals were prioritised for cities and conurbations 
needing to stimulate their economic growth: 
“…Other than Cambridgeshire and Peterborough, all the combined authorities 
established as of June 2017 are in city regions, many of which have tended to 
have comparatively low economic performance: the West of England and 
Cambridgeshire and Peterborough are the only areas that have higher average 
gross value-added per hour than the UK average.”  
(NAO (2017), Progress in Setting Up Combined Authorities. Paragraph 2.2, 
page 21) 
4.16 Bringing authorities together to discuss, decide and address complex issues 
surrounding economic growth across administrative borders is not a straightforward 
process. The consultations have indicated that it takes constituent members some time 
to get used to the idea that they need to think across borders and new ways of 
 
 
operating. Therefore, it takes time for working partnerships to develop. As stated 
during the consultations with new MCAs:  
“Members tend to prioritise their district. It needs consensus and it takes 
compromise to deliver more benefits for the whole area; it is [devolution deals] a 
new way of thinking for everyone to ensure growth across combined authority.” 
“Members aren’t used to the levels of risk and uncertainty the combined 
authority operates with, and they often want to see a detailed step-by-step plan 
which isn’t always possible.” 
4.17 In all consultations, strong working partnerships between authorities are seen as 
critical for the success of the devolution deal – for both strategic design and decision 
making. According to the consultations, having an established partnership and sharing 
a common purpose or identity prior to the devolution deal helps (in terms of time taking 
to reach decisions, setting priorities and putting workable systems in place). Even so, 
as stated during the consultations:  
“Leaders on [CA] boards and councillors involved need to “make it real” locally.  Buy in 
levels are different across the CA; often leadership is fully engaged but officers less 
so.’  
‘…There is a need to cultivate constantly buy-in.’ 
4.18 According to the consultations, the timing imposed by central government for agreeing 
devolution deals has not allowed for partnerships to be developed, particularly among 
new MCAs. In a few cases also, the authorities have come together out of necessity 
despite significant differences. As stated during one consultation, 
“…The authorities agreed to come together to sign the devolution deal on the 
understanding of suspension of mutual animosity for mutual gain…and the CA 
hardwires districts into policymaking.” 
4.19  In some cases, authorities continue to work together because, as stated during one 
consultation, 
“The divorce is not an option now – the cost would be too great …in addition, 
this is good for the citizens of the whole area…therefore, it has to work.” 
4.20 An OECD guide on successful partnerships25 states that ‘…To be efficient, a 
partnership should have recognisable and autonomous structure to help establish its 
identity. The structure should have stability and permanence as well as flexibility, and it 
is helpful if it has a certain degree of autonomy, i.e. freedom from political influence. It 
is also important to review lines of communication to ensure that all partners are kept 
informed and involved.’ 
4.21 By design, this cannot be the case for the partnerships of local authorities coming 
together under a CA arrangement. During the consultations it was stated that CAs are 
political by default and therefore inherently adversarial. For many of those consulted, 
this also means that it may take longer for local authorities that have not previously 
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worked together to start sharing a common vision and look for mutually beneficial 
solutions.  
4.22 During the consultations the following conditions were also identified as significant 
factors that would impact upon establishing effective and sustainable partnerships 
between authorities and ultimately, an effective implementation of the devolution deal: 
• Significant investment is needed up front in the form of time, guidance and 
funding by all involved including central government to ensure that participating 
authorities can work across political interests;  
• Utilising informal networks and personalities who can work together beyond 
political agendas and can build trust among partners i.e. soft power; and  
• Careful succession planning for key individuals involved in the devolution process 
(to avoid losing any momentum gained through the development of the first 
devolution deals and major disruptions in delivering the devolution deal) while 
also valuing diversity brought in by new individuals.  
Processes 
4.23 Consultations and desk-based reviews of publicly available documents and documents 
directly provided to the research team during the consultations, have provided 
considerable feedback on key processes involved in implementing devolutions deals to 
date. These processes, as described in the devolution framework in Figure 4, include: 
• Civic leadership and joined up systems for strategy design and decision making; 
• Appropriate governance systems for accountability, scrutiny and transparency; 
• Civic engagement and public participation in local governance;  
• Appropriate resources to take on the devolution deal; and 
• Reliable local intelligence (information and analysis). 
Civic Leadership and Metro-mayors 
4.24 With the exception of Cornwall, all devolution deals encourage authorities that come 
together to have a directly elected mayor. The directly elected metro-mayors chair their 
area’s CA, and in partnership with the CA, exercise the powers and functions devolved 
from central government, as set out in the local area's devolution deal and the 
constitution of the CA (with most CA constitutions either prepared or amended in the 
last six to eight months to January 2020). 
4.25 In general, in an MCA, there could be the following three points of power and 
accountability. 
• The directly elected Mayor exercising mayoral functions; 
• The CA consisting of local authority leaders and the directly elected mayor i.e. the 
Cabinet or Board acting collectively; and 
 
 
• The MCA’s overview and scrutiny committees, holding both the Mayor and the 
MCA Board to account. 
4.26 In terms of leadership and accountability, overall leadership and ultimate accountability 
rests primarily with the metro-mayors in all CAs – and this has been confirmed during 
discussions in all areas. However, the degree of powers of Mayors in decision making 
varies. Some examples to demonstrate this variation are described below: 
• In London, the Mayor is required by law to take some decisions personally e.g. 
decisions relating to the AEB.  
• The West of England Mayor has one vote and so do the other voting members; 
any questions to be decided by the West of England CA are decided by a 
majority of the members, subject to that majority including the vote of the West of 
England Mayor, unless otherwise set out in legislation.26  
• In Tees Valley CA, the Constitution of the CA27 sets out that some major 
decisions require the unanimous agreement of the CA Cabinet. As stated in 
paragraph 27 of the CA’s Constitution, in the event that the Mayor opposes a 
proposal, but a majority of the Cabinet is in agreement, the proposal shall be 
deemed to have been neither carries nor rejected.  In these circumstances, a 
decision shall be deferred for a future meeting. 
• In Cambridgeshire and Peterborough CA, the Mayor has the power to veto every 
decision made by the Cabinet (according to the consultations, this power has 
never been used, but all members are aware of it).  
4.27 The CAs’ Constitution documents and codes of conduct tend to describe in varying 
detail the role (including leadership and accountability), functions and powers of the 
metro-mayors. Strategic leadership coming from the mayor is often explicitly stated in 
the CAs’ Constitutions e.g. in London, Cambridgeshire and Peterborough CA, Greater 
Manchester CA. In fact, as an example of good practice, the Cambridgeshire and 
Peterborough CA Constitution published in September 201928 clearly and simply sets 
out the leadership role of the CA’s Mayor – an extract of which is presented below as 
follows: 
“1.1. The Mayor and the other Members of the Combined Authority will work 
closely together. Specifically:  
(a) the Mayor will provide overall leadership and chair Combined Authority 
Board meetings;… 
(b) the Mayor may nominate lead member responsibilities, the membership and 
chairs of executive committees to each member of the seven Constituent 
Councils who will act in a supporting and advisory function to the Mayor and 
Combined Authority for their respective policy areas (see para 1.6 below); and  
 






(c) the Mayor will also be a member of the Business Board recognising the 
importance of the Business Board’s role and the private sector in any growth 
strategies or delivery for the Combined Authority area.  
1.2. The Mayor will by virtue of holding office be a Member and the Chair of the 
Combined Authority Board.  
1.3. The Mayor must appoint a statutory Deputy Mayor of the Combined 
Authority.” 
4.28 In Greater Manchester CA, the Mayor’s (currently Andy Burnham) leadership, 
accountability and responsibilities are summarised as follows29: 
“Accountable to and representing the people of all 10 boroughs in Greater 
Manchester, Andy steers the work of Greater Manchester’s Combined Authority, 
leading on issues such as the economy, transport, police and fire services, to 
ensure Greater Manchester is one of the best places in the world.   
Responsible for transforming public services and shaping the future of our 
region, the Mayor represents Greater Manchester people, making the case for 
our region at the heart of government and on the world stage. 
Andy is the chair and eleventh member of Greater Manchester Combined 
Authority. The leaders of the 10 councils form the Mayor’s Cabinet. He is also 
supported by a Deputy Mayor for Policing and Crime and a Deputy Mayor for 
Economic Growth and Business. 
The job of the Mayor ranges from setting budgets and priorities for Greater 
Manchester’s public services to acting as an ambassador for the region.” 
4.29 In some areas accountability and strategic leadership are clearly set out as distinct. 
For example, in the West of England CA, the CA’s mayor’s role is described as 
follows30: 
“The Government wants to have a named individual accountable for the 
additional powers and money being devolved to the West of England Combined 
Authority. The West of England Mayor is a condition of the Government’s 
devolution offer. 
Sometimes referred to in the media as a ‘Metro-mayor’, he or she is a local 
government executive leader, directly elected by the local voting public. The 
West of England Mayor is responsible for the West of England Combined 
Authority.” 
4.30 In the West Midlands, the mayor is ultimately accountable for the CA. At the same 
time, all key documentation makes it clear that strategic leadership comes from the 
Mayor and the leaders of the seven constituent local authorities, which have full voting 
rights. This is shown in Figure 5 and described below (direct extract from the CA’s 






“Leadership of the WMCA comes from the Mayor and the leaders of the seven 
constituent local authorities, which have full voting rights. The leadership also 
includes the chairs of the Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs) which are 
business-led organisations that help build relationships between businesses and 
local authorities.  
Non-constituent authorities, which include the LEPs and ten local councils from 
across the wider West Midlands region, have reduced voting rights but play a 
crucial role at board level, helping to inform policy and drive forward the 
WMCA agenda.” 
Figure 5: West Midlands CA Governance Model 
 
Source: West Midlands Constitution 
4.31 In most cases, the current form and shape of civic leadership has been primarily 
framed by legislation and the desired balance of powers between a metro-mayor and 
the authorities participating in the devolution process.  
4.32 In contrast, Cornwall’s current model has been informed from a range of stakeholders 
and civic engagement. Civic leadership and accountability in Cornwall is based on a 
governance structure that consists of the Leader (elected annually by the Full Council 
which consists of 123 Councillors representing Cornwall) and Cabinet model, and has 
been informed by an extensive consultation process including the public and a range 
of stakeholders. The approach to the current model has been based on a 
comprehensive review that started as part of the Councils 2016 Governance Review. 
The Review looked at three possible models and was led by the Council’s Constitution 
and Governance Committee, supported by and independent external panel, known as 
the Governance Review External Group (GREG) also gathered evidence for the 
Committee to consider.  This included getting the views of partner organisations, and 
town and parish councils and explored how different models of decision- making works 
in other councils. The Review looked at three possible models including an elected 
Mayor for the wider area mayor, the other two being the current model of Leader and 
Cabinet system, and a Committee system. 
 
 
4.33 Views on directly elected metro-mayors and their role in devolution are, on the whole, 
positive in the localities were a metro-mayor is present. Benefits from having metro-
mayors are set out in the feedback provided during the consultations as follows: 
“The mayoral system has proven to be: nimble, agile, responsive, flexible, 
effective, efficient, accountable and ambitious (wants to do things).” 
“The mayor [is] useful with building the profile of MCA and wielding soft power.” 
“The mayor has provided a focus point and the personality needed for sovereign 
decision making in a diverse area (though never used veto powers assigned to 
this role)…in comparison with the past, things are happening faster and 
together; regeneration schemes are run much quicker now than in the past.” 
“The benefit of the mayoral system is that there is a consistent point of 
accountability…chaos disappears.” 
“The mayor creates an accountable head for the area  – a role previously held 
by many quangos.”  
“The ‘convening powers’ of the Mayor’s office prove very useful in engaging 
many members, groups and representatives of civic society, fostering greater 
view-sharing and participation in the process of policy formation.” 
“The mayoral approach to devolution provides simplification for central 
government and provides local authorities with a stronger voice.” 
4.34 At the same time, the consultations have highlighted a few risks associated with having 
a directly elected metro-mayor for the area, as demonstrated by the following 
comments made during the consultations: 
“Not ready for a mayor ...mayor was thrust upon us but we had enough history 
of collaboration to deal with it.” 
“In London, the budget has been delegated to the mayor ‘and only the mayor’, 
with a governance regime surrounding it which has three separate points in 
which the mayor must sign off on a policy – there is no clear rationale for this 
approach and there is a need to balance flexibility and speed with 
accountability.” 
“Metro-mayors leadership styles affect both the approach adopted and the 
relationship with the Chief Executive of the CA.” 
“A strategic authority is needed for implementation of devolution deals and not a 
figurehead.” 
“Too much focus on a figurehead diverts attention and resources from delivery.” 
 
 
Governance Systems – Scrutiny 
4.35 In general, what is understood by the term ‘public sector governance’ varies depending 
on the jurisdiction.31 With reference to devolved institutions, achieving good 
governance requires effective arrangements in scrutiny, audit and transparency to 
ensure delivery of effective accountability and increase public and stakeholder trust in 
the new institutions and approach. These principles are set out in the English law and 
guidance produced by central government. For example, combined authorities in 
England are required to establish overview and scrutiny committees by the Cities and 
Local Government Devolution Act 2016.  Nevertheless, in June 2016, the Committee 
of Public Accounts32 stated that: 
“The specific powers devolved as a result of devolution deals will vary across 
different parts of the country, and will require more effective local accountability 
arrangements to be put in place.” 
4.36 Further provisions for overview, scrutiny and audit arrangements by the CAs have 
been made by the Combined Authorities (Overview and Scrutiny Committees, Access 
to Information and Audit Committees) Order 2017 (SI 2017/68).  
4.37 The government also requires all MCAs (and all Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs)) 
to produce and publish a Local Assurance Framework that sets out the arrangements 
they have introduced to ensure that public money is being managed effectively. To this 
purpose, in January 2019, central government (e.g. MHCLG) also published the 
National Local Growth Assessment Framework (NLGAF) to provide detailed guidance 
on what is required. For LEPs, this document contains mandatory governance, 
accountability and transparency requirements and non-mandatory best practice. For 
MCAs, this document represents only guidance.  
4.38 In general, mayors are held to account by the MCA Cabinet made up of leaders of the 
constituent council members of the MCA through often multi-layered arrangements – 
and the MCAs’ constitutions tend to set out the detail of these arrangements. The 
general feedback from the consultations on this issue is that this level of scrutiny is 
necessary but the right balance needs to be found between vision, statutory 
requirements and time it may take to implement policies. As stated during one of the 
consultations: 
“All these systems in place make it a complex organisation environment to work 
with – many different partners involved and multifaceted approach can slow 
down decision making and can frustrate.” 
4.39 In London, whereas the Mayor of London is the Greater London Authority’s executive 
arm, it is the London Assembly’s primary to hold the Mayor to account - including 
reviewing the decisions the Mayor takes. The fundamental difference between London 
and the other areas in this respect is that the CA Cabinet is made up of the leaders 
from each constituent local authority. The 25 London Assembly Members are elected 
at the same time as the Mayor of London, 11 of which representing the whole capital 
and 14 elected by constituencies. Assembly investigations are carried out by cross-
 
31 CIPFA and IFAC (2014), International Framework: Good governance in the public sector. This was developed 
jointly by the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy (CIPFA) and the International Federation of 
Accountants (IFAC). 
32 House of Commons, Committee of Public Accounts, Devolution in England: governance, financial accountability 
and following the taxpayer pound (Published on 18 December 2016 by authority of the House of Commons). 
 
 
party committees and cover areas like, energy and the environment, transport, 
policing, housing, planning, health and the economy. Another difference between the 
London Assembly and MCAs’ Cabinet meetings is that all London Assembly meetings 
are open to the public and the London Assembly has powers of summons. The 
consultations have also fed back on the role of the London Assembly as a scrutiny 
function and have highlighted some differences with the scrutiny approach adopted in 
MCAs, as described below. 
“Generally the Assembly understands the Mayor’s powers and goals, as well as 
the issues impacting London more broadly and this places them in a good 
position.” 
“The Assembly is also useful to the Mayor as a forum in which things can be 
explained; the Mayor will frequently choose to appear in front of committees in 
order to publicly explain his decisions and policy.”  
“Councils much more tribal/partisan while the structure of the Assembly 
allows/enables collaborative scrutiny. The 2-tier system of constituency and 
London-wide members also seems to work well, with Assembly Members 
specialising in specific areas that matter to all Londoners (e.g. transport).” 
“The Assembly lacks power to influence GLA policy in any real or meaningful 
way due to the nature of its setup, particularly the system of post-hoc scrutiny, 
which allows the Mayor to set the entire direction of policy and essentially 
dictate priorities to the Assembly, which is a more reactive body.”  
“The issues on which the London Assembly choose to scrutinise the Mayor are 
generally chosen on an ‘ad-hoc and reactive’ basis and tend to focus on 
debates which are already occurring (often initiated by lobbyist groups).  
However, if they focused more on broader issues a greater political discussion 
could perhaps be generated; it is in this area the multi-party PR Assembly 
system would work far better than MCAs.” 
“London Assembly or Senate of 32 London Councillors? Do councils/councillors 
have time to run an effective scrutiny function as well as deliver services at a 
local level?” 
4.40 In contrast to the above issues of post-hoc scrutiny that is perceived as weakening the 
position of the scrutiny institution, in Greater Manchester CA, the terms of reference for 
the Greater Manchester’s three thematic overview and scrutiny committees33 states 
that their work programme is likely to include pre-decisions scrutiny and review of 
emerging policy areas, thus giving the opportunity to authorities/their representatives 
for engagement at policy making stage. As stated during the consultations: 
“…This approach adds another stage, though generally can get through in a 
single month, which helps.  It is also embedded into the whole process so it 
does not create too many delays later on and leads to better policy formation.”  
 
33 GM’s three scrutiny committees are: Corporate Issues and Reform (GMCA as a corporate entity & public sector 




4.41 The Liverpool City Region MCA has also adopted a similar approach. A stated during 
one of the consultations in the area, 
“Pre-scrutiny, involves experts and wider public, challenges all policy issues and 
is therefore informed by the best evidence base. This approach also helps 
building up a broader public consciousness of the CA.” 
4.42 The desk-based review and consultations indicate that devolved institutions have in 
place variations of both an Audit committee and an Overview and Scrutiny committee 
(and some e.g. Greater Manchester CA splitting having overview and scrutiny 
committees across several areas).  In Cornwall, the scrutiny function is required by law 
to act as ‘critical friend’ to the Cabinet; it comprises a Scrutiny Management Committee 
and a Health and Social Care Scrutiny Committee (Figure 6).  
Figure 6: Cornwall Council’s Governance Model 
 
Source: https://www.cornwall.gov.uk/media/15393348/governance-bitesize-guide-proof-2.pdf 
4.43 The consultations and desk-based review indicate that all governance systems among 
devolved institutions have some common elements but they vary in the way they are 
set, mainly reflecting the powers assigned to the mayors and members of the 
authorities involved in the devolved institutions. For example, MCAs are required to 
have34: 
• An officer who is responsible for financial administration; 
• A scrutiny officer; 






• A head of paid service. 
4.44 MCAs are also required to appoint independent auditors and publish their accounts. 
Their audit committees are required to contain at least one independent person. 
4.45 The research has shown that the vast majority of CAs had all these in place at the time 
of writing of this report (see Figure 7). 
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35 Assistant Director – scrutiny & investigation. 
36 Assistant Director – scrutiny & investigation. 
37 Cambridgeshire and Peterborough missed the deadline (31st July 19) to publish audited accounts due to delays 
within the external auditor Ernst & Young. 
38 The Audit Committee comprises 12 people, 11 members from the three constituent authorities of WECA, and 
one independent member. However, only 11 people from the constituent authorities are listed as members and in 




4.46 To assess the nature and extent of alignment to these principles, a review of the 
accessibility and content of key strategic documents produced by the authorities was 
undertaken in terms of: 
• What information authorities make publicly available; 
• How easily this information can be accessed; and 
• How often strategic documents are published/updated. 
4.47 Documents reviewed included: 
• Constitutions; 
• Statements of accounts; 
• Governance statements; 
• Governance plan/reviews; 
• Economic/industrial strategies; 
• Annual report/assessments; and 
• Skills Strategies or Plans. 
4.48 This desk-based review has established that: 
• MCAs’ core governing documents (constitution, governance statement, statement 
of accounts) are generally publicly available in all websites. However, the 
contents and scope in each area can differ greatly. For example, constitutions 
display significant variations in lengths and include differing commitments to 
accountability, transparency and the ‘Principles of Public Life’. As an example of 
good practice, The Greater Manchester CA Constitution (July 2018) sets out a 
common set of principles under which all decisions of the Greater Manchester CA 
should be made. These are set out in paragraph 11.3 of the Constitution as 
follows: 
o Proportionality (meaning the action must be proportionate to the results to be 
achieved);  
o Due consultation (including the taking of relevant professional advice); 
o Respect for human rights;  
o Presumption in favour of openness;  
o Clarity of aims and desired outcomes; and  
o Due consideration to be given to alternative options.  
• Adherence to publication schemes varies. For example, some authorities have 
designated ‘publication scheme’ pages that contain only key documents; others 
outline where each document falls under the Model Publication Scheme.  
 
 
• Some authorities are far more prolific publishers than others – and this is often 
related to how long the authority may have been established. 
• Publishing practice of core documents can vary. For example, some publish 
governance statements as individual documents; others include these as part of 
annual statement of accounts. 
• Minutes of various meetings are mostly accessible and contain all relevant 
decision-making information.  
• All devolved authorities are now publishing their organisational structures. 
• In terms of transparency, in general, local authorities are required to adopt, 
outline and adhere to some variation of Model Publication Scheme and the Local 
Government Transparency Act, and yet there seems to be a significant disparity 
between the levels of commitment to these displayed among different 
organisations. 
Resources  
4.49 Consultations with internal stakeholders indicate that for most MCAs there is a gap 
between political aspiration and current MCA capacity. Clearly, some devolved 
institutions are operating with fewer resources than others. A few MCAs were also 
undergoing through organisational changes at the time of this research. The 
consultations indicate that implementation of the devolution deals started in parallel 
with staff resourcing in most MCAs. Coupled with uncertainty over future funding, this 
meant that human resource and organisational planning might not have been very 
structured in the early stages of the MCAs’ operations. 
4.50 The consultations with internal stakeholders also indicate that MCAs deal with a raft of 
organisational and human resource issues. These, for example, include recruitment 
and retention of staff, particularly progression routes for their staff, transparency in 
recruitment and attracting and rewarding relevant skills and talent with due 
consideration of local government practices; strengthening both officers and Members’ 
capabilities to deal with cultural changes; and working practices to encourage 
inclusivity and diversity. 
Civic Engagement 
4.51 The consultations have indicated that on the whole, systems and process relating to 
civic engagement and participation represent work in progress, particularly among the 
newer MCAs.  
4.52 Review of the documents listed in paragraph 4.48 indicates that it has not been 
possible for all authorities to engage the general public in the original design of their 
devolution deals. A number of reasons have been given to justify this lack of wider 
public engagement. For example, during the consultations, it was stated that:  
“…there is an issue with scrutiny or strategy design involving the general public, 
as most do not understand the powers, which may or may not be held by the 
Mayor or CA. Public polls on CA or Mayoral spending and projects would 
generate expectations that cannot be met, as much that the public wants to 
achieve is functionally impossible within the current remit.” 
 
 
4.53 In implementing devolution, CAs tend to hold meetings that are open to the public but 
attendance and engagement is currently limited. On the whole, the general public 
(including businesses) are more likely to be involved in consultations related to specific 
capital infrastructure projects and the production of economic strategy documents and 
skill plans, including the recent Local Industrial Strategies. Examples of civic 
engagement are described below: 
• As discussed in paragraph 4.33, the Cornwall’s current model of local 
governance has been informed from a range of stakeholders and civic 
engagement. The council also developed a social media campaign using 
#standupforCornwall to generate conversations about the devolution deal. It also 
developed a public pledge for residents to sign up to and support devolution.  
• In London, publicly visible scrutiny exists in the form of Mayoral Question Time. 
There is also a dedicated Community Engagement Team that connects the 
authority with local communities across Greater London. 
• In Liverpool, the Liverpool City Region CA invited PLACED, a local organisation, 
to deliver a series of pop-up events across the city region. These events aim to 
capture local people’s views, as part of the “Our Places” consultation, to influence 
the Combined Authority’s first Spatial Development Strategy (SDS), setting out a 
strategic framework for the development and use of land looking over the next 15 
years. 
• In Greater Manchester, the public contributed to the development of the spatial 
framework – with 30,000 responses received. The Greater Manchester CA also 
recognised that they need to engage more with the community and voluntary 
sector for the preparation of their Local Industrial Industry and the GM 
Community Voluntary and Social Enterprise (GM CVSE) reference group was 
convened to inform the process and the strategy. 
Reliable local intelligence 
4.54 The consultations have indicated that all devolved institutions recognise the need for a 
strong evidence base to justify strategic planning and decision making. This is 
demonstrated by the production of Local Industrial Strategies (that tends to follow 
government guidance39) and various strategic documents produced by all authorities to 
date.  
4.55 Feedback from external consultations also indicate that in some cases, there has 
been, as stated during a consultation “Greater data sharing and collaboration on 
gathering evidence since the MCA inception.” 
4.56 The research has also shown that the significance of monitoring and evaluation 







5 Public and Business Perceptions of 
Local Governance Roles 
5.1 Two surveys were undertaken to establish the nature and extent of the understanding 
and perceptions of the general public and businesses with regard to key local 
governance roles and concepts that are part of devolved institutions.  Key findings 
from the two surveys (general public and businesses) are summarised below. 
Appendix F presents detailed survey results from the surveys at devolved authority 
level. 
The public survey found that, on average (i.e. across all devolved authorities), a similar 
proportion of public were aware of the terms ‘combined authority’ and ‘local enterprise 
partnership’, that is 46% and 45% respectively. Awareness of the terms of ‘local authority’ 
and ‘chambers of commerce’ was significantly higher at 96% and 86% respectively.  
The business survey indicated that, one average, a larger proportion of business was 
aware of the term ‘local enterprise partnership’ than ‘combined authority’, 64% in 
comparison with 43%. Awareness of the term ‘local authority’ was similar to the general 
public survey (96%) whilst awareness of ‘chambers of commerce’ was higher  (90%).  
Respondents were asked whether they knew what the term ‘combined authority’ meant. 
Nearly three quarters of general public respondents (73%), across all combined authority 
areas, believed that they knew what the term ‘combined authority’ meant. The equivalent 
figure among business respondents was 70%. 
Nearly three quarters of general public respondents (72%) across all combined authority 
areas reported that they were aware of who the metro-mayor for their area was. The 
equivalent figure among business respondents was 66%.  
At the same time, around half the general public respondents disagreed with the 
statement that ‘people are clear about who is responsible for leadership’ in their area 
(around 20% thought that people were clear about who is responsible for leadership and 
the rest were not sure or did not know). Business respondents tended to be much clearer 
about who is responsible for leadership in their area than the general public. 
In general, specific projects promoted by the MCA or the mayors are relatively well known 
and mostly supported by the general public and businesses (with the level of support 
varying between businesses and the public depending on the project). 
In the majority of MCA areas, general public respondents indicated that their greatest 
interest was in decisions taken in the region for health and environmental issues. 
Business respondents in the majority of combined authority areas indicated their greatest 
interest was in decisions for health, crime policing, transport and business rates.  
The surveys found relatively low levels of engagement with information resources 
produced by the combined authority e.g. social media, web pages, council meeting 
minutes or strategic documents. The exception was Cornwall where a relatively higher 
proportion reported engagement with sources of information by the authority.   
 
 
General public respondents were also asked to what extent they agree that too many 
policy decisions affecting their area are made outside it. Respondents in Cornwall 
showed the highest agreement with the statement (64%), while respondents in London 
expressed the lowest level of agreement (33%). 
5.2 It is worth noting that respondents to the public survey appear to be more interested in 
political or policy affairs than the average population on the basis of their participation 
in mayoral elections. For example, overall across all combined authority areas, more 
than half (56%) of respondents reported having participated in the most recent 
elections for their area’s mayor. Of the business survey respondents, one quarter of 
respondents (23%) in all combined authority areas stated that their business was a 
member of a local organisation, such as the Chamber of Commerce or the Federation 
of Small Businesses (64% of them reported that their business was not a member of a 








6 Conclusions  
6.1 In addition to developing a theoretical evaluation framework for devolution to inform 
this and future evaluations, the aims of this research can be summarised as follows: 
• To examine the institutional processes of devolved institutions that have been 
embedded in strategic planning and decision making). Institutional processes 
explored include leadership, scrutiny, transparency, accountability and civic 
engagement mechanisms and assurances.  
• To explore some early outcome factors on public perceptions and understanding 
in relation to leadership, transparency, accountability and civic engagement in 
decision- making and implementation of decisions by devolved institutions.  
• To draw on the evidence collected through desk-based research and 
consultations to illustrate the extent to which the policy aim of improving local 
government institutions has materialised (or is very likely to materialise in the 
near future), and to identify unintended consequences, risks and threats.  
6.2 The research undertaken to address these issues was conducted during a period of 
significant political developments in the UK. Most study MCAs were also in the midst of 
major organisational changes. Nevertheless, the research findings provide a 
considerable insight into the institutional processes in devolved institutions (including 
the study MCAs, GLA and Cornwall). The research has also identified key benefits and 
good practice emerging in local government institutional arrangements as a result of 
implementing devolution policy as well as issues for consideration in future policy.   
6.3 The review of the institutional processes has shown that it is relatively too early for 
some institutional processes such as scrutiny and transparency to be fully embedded 
in policy design and decision making in the MCAs. Meeting key statutory requirements 
has been MCAs’ first priority, and all devolved authorities currently have systems in 
place that meet legal requirements around overview, scrutiny and audit. (Local) 
assurance frameworks have also been prepared by all MCAs (mainly reflecting the 
MCAs’ individual constitutions and the government’s National Local Growth Assurance 
Framework). However, scrutiny processes involved a range of stakeholder and the 
public are more common at post-policy design stages – nevertheless good practices of 
stakeholder and public engagement in pre-policy design stages also exist. Moreover, 
what is understood by the term ‘transparency’ varies considerably among MCAs. 
6.4 The consultations undertaken in London and Cornwall provide useful feedback on the 
scrutiny approaches embedded in decision making and strategic planning in the 
respective areas.    
6.5 The consultations undertaken as part of this evaluation and the review of relevant 
documents suggest that, overall leadership and ultimate accountability rests primarily 
with the metro-mayors in all MCAs. However, the extent of mayoral powers in strategic 
planning or decisions making varies across MCAs In general, a mayoral combined 
authority (MCA) has the following three levels of power: 
• The directly elected mayor exercising mayoral functions; 
 
 
• The MCA Board (or Cabinet) consisting of local authority leaders and the directly 
elected mayor; and 
• The MCA’s overview and scrutiny committees, holding both the mayor and the 
MCA Board to account. 
6.6 The research shows that the roles and functions for each individual level are made 
clear by all MCAs. However, the factors that have informed the balance of powers 
between these levels are not always made explicit. 
6.7 The consultations with MCA staff and key stakeholders also indicate that setting up 
good governance structures has required significant resources. A review of MCAs 
organisational structures indicate that the MCAs’ institutional capacity has not fully 
evolved as yet; or where devolved institutions have been established for a while, a 
review is needed to ensure that organisational structures and capabilities continue to 
be fit for purpose. At the same time, feedback provided during the consultations 
indicates that support for collaborative working and nurturing of partnerships at local 
level remains embryonic in many areas. Consultations with external stakeholders 
indicate that devolved institutions have not always capitalised on the knowledge and 
expertise that could be provided by the existing staff in constituent authorities (e.g. 
secondments of staff tend to be rare). 
6.8 The surveys with businesses and the general public indicate that the key terms 
associated with the devolution policy i.e. ‘metro-mayors’ and ‘combined authorities’ are 
not as well known as other more established terms such as ‘chamber of commerce’ or 
local enterprise partnership’.  At the same time, the surveys have found that specific 
projects promoted by the combined authority or the mayors are relatively well known 
and mostly supported by the general public and businesses. In localities with a well-
established mayoral model, e.g. London, the public is less likely to think that policy 
decisions affecting their area are taken outside it.  
6.9 Views on metro-mayors and their role in devolution are, on the whole, positive in the 
localities where a metro-mayor is present. The main benefits are perceived to be 
higher visibility of the area and clearer accountability in comparison to previous 
arrangements. In particular, metro-mayors are seen as already having a positive 
impact in terms of providing leadership and a powerful single voice representing the 
needs of local communities in areas where the local links with central government may 
have been fragmented or relatively weak. 
6.10 Furthermore, the research shows an improvement in perceptions about the 
effectiveness of local government institutions. For most consultees, the key benefits of 
the devolved arrangements include better coordination in strategic planning and 
decision making, more commerciality, improved credibility and effective collaborations 
across a wide areas for issues, ranging from transport and large infrastructure projects 
to place promotional, regeneration and social issues.  
6.11 The vast majority of consultees also acknowledge that, as a direct result of a single 
voice representing all neighbouring areas, more public and private investment has 
been brought into the areas. As stated during one of the consultations: 
“…Trying to sell a single place previously was difficult… the CA has looked at 
what each area is good and their strengths and has brought everything into a 
cohesive plan….this makes it easier to present to a developer or investor.”  
 
 
Key Issues for Consideration  
6.12 Success of devolution depends on a number of factors. This research has highlighted 
a number of issues that need to be considered in future policy. These include: 
• Clarity about the roles of various devolution mechanisms and institutions. Visible 
civic leaders such as metro-mayors provide a powerful voice for an area. 
However, their role, remit and powers need to be clarified and better understood 
by internal and external stakeholders. The same applies to the role of the Chief 
Executives of devolved institutions and other senior management posts. 
• Improving civic engagement in devolved strategic planning and decision making. 
A review of different models of decentralised governance arrangements around 
the world40 indicates that the success of any sub-national governance reform 
ultimately largely depends on the public support that the decentralised structures 
gain. Improving civic engagement in strategic planning and decision making 
would require a coordinated effort by central government and devolved 
institutions to first raise awareness of what devolution is about.  
• Strengthening capacity and capabilities of devolved institutions to take on 
devolved powers and long-term planning and delivery. For most MCAs, there is 
gap between political aspiration and current MCA capacity. Capacity includes 
both funding sources for long-term planning and organisational and management 
practices e.g. leadership styles, structures, people, strategy and planning, 
resources, institutional processes and partnerships.41 
• With reference to the latter, the consultations undertaken as part of this research 
also indicate that local authorities (in particular large ones) and MCA 
organisations need to improve and strengthen their working relationships. 
6.13 Figure 8 also summarises benefits and risks that have been identified through the 
desk-based reviews and the consultations. These include benefits and issues for 
consideration for the organisations involved or affected by the implementation of 
devolution policy, specific services/functions delivered at local level, businesses and 




40 Competitive Cities in a Global Economy, OECD, 2017. 
41 The Common Assessment Framework (CAF) 
Improving Public Organisations through Self-Assessment, CAF 2013, European Public Administration Network 
and European Institute of Public Administration. 
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APPENDIX B: LIST OF CONSULTEES 
Combined Authority Consultees Job Title  (at time of consultation) 
Cambridgeshire and 



























Interim Transport Director 
Business and Skills Director 
Interim Section 73 Officer 
Director of Strategy and 
Assurance  
Director of Housing and 
Development 




Interim Scrutiny Officer 
Scrutiny Officer 
Governance Advisor 
Head of Finance 
Business Board 




CEO, Cambridge City Council 
Cambridgeshire and Fire 
Rescue Service 
East Cambs District Council 
 
 





Jessica Bawden,  
 
 




Mike Hill  
CEO, Cambridgeshire Police 
and Crime Commissioner 
Office 




Fenland District Council 
Cambridgeshire County 
Council 
CEO, Greater Cambridge 
Partnership 
CEO, South Cambs District 
Council 

















Director Strategy and 
Delivery 
Senior Policy Officer, 
Cornwall Deal 
Senior Development Officer 
Head of Economy 
Head of Investment and 
Growth 
Strategic Director - 
Neighbourhoods 
Service Director – Strategy 
and Engagement 















Chair of Kernow Clinical 
Commissioning Group 
Adult Social Care and Health 
Strategic Director 
Chief Executive of Coastline 
Housing 
Innovation Lead 




Isles of Scilly 
Greater Manchester 
Combined Authority (GMCA)  
Andrew Lightfoot 
Simon Nokes  








Paul Lynch  
 
 
Geoff Little  
Deputy CEO 
GMCA – Director, Strategy 
and Research 
GMCA – Assistant Director, 
Strategy and Research 
GMCA – Treasurer 
GMCA – Business Director  
GMCA – Employment Policy 
Lead 
Executive Lead, Strategy & 
Systems Development – 
Health and Social Care 
Partnership 
Deputy Director of Strategy & 
System Development - – 
Health and Social Care 
Partnership 
Bury CC CE 
Liverpool City Region (LCR)  Frank Rogers 
Mark Bousfield 
Chief of Staff 
Director of Commercial 





















Merseytravel – Director of 
Integrated Transport 
Merseytravel – Director of 
Corporate Governance 
LCRCA – Policy and Strategy 
Lead 
Liverpool LEP – Chair 
University of Liverpool – VC 
Civic Engagement  
KPMG – Liverpool Office 
Senior Partner  
Avison Young – Principal  
 
Managing Director, Liverpool 
Liverpool Chamber of 
Commerce –  
Chief Executive 
Liverpool CC 
London (Greater London 
Authority, London Assembly 










Caroline Russell  
GLA – Chief Officer 
GLA – Executive Director, 
Resources 
 
London Assembly – Chair  
London Assembly – Vice 
Chair 
London Assembly – Leader, 
Conservative Group 
London Assembly – Leader, 
Labour Group  
London Assembly – Leader, 









Tim Steer  





















London Assembly – Liberal 
Democrats  
 
GLA – Mayoral Director, 
Policy 
GLA – Deputy Mayor, 
Transport  
GLA – Head of Transport 
GLA – Deputy Mayor, 
Business 
GLA – Senior Advisor to the 
Mayor, Business and Digital 
Policy 
GLA – Executive Director, 
Housing and Land 
GLA – Head of Housing 
Strategy 
GLA – Deputy Mayor, 
Housing and Residential 
GLA – Assistant Director, 
Housing 
Mayor of London’s Chief of 
Staff 
GLA – Interim Executive 
Director, Development, 
Enterprise and Environment  
GLA – Deputy Mayor for 
Planning, Regeneration and 
Skills 
GLA – Assistant Director, 
Skills and Employment  
GLA – Assistant Director, 
Scrutiny and Investigations 
 
 





Amanda Skelton + 





Economic Policy Lead 
LEP Chairman 
 
West Midlands Combined 
Authority (WMCA)  
Deborah Cadman 









WMCA – Chief Executive 
WMCA – Head of 
Governance 
WMCA – Head of the Chief 
Executive’s Office  
WMCA – Director of 
Productivity and Skills 
Walsall Council Chief 
Executive 
Solihull Council Chief 
Executive 
Rugby Borough Council 
Birmingham City Council 
Chief Executive 
West of England Combined 
Authority (WECA)  






Head of Policy and Strategy 
Director of Investment and 
Corporate Services 






APPENDIX C: SURVEYS 
METHODOLOGY 
Public Survey 
To understand perceptions of devolved authorities, a survey of public perceptions was 
conducted. 4,080 responses were collected in total, on the basis of over 500 responses in 
eight devolved authorities using a YouGov online panel.  
The questionnaire was used to explore respondents’:  
 (a) Awareness of Combined Authorities, 
 (b) Civic engagement, 
 (c) Perceptions of local environment and improvements.  
Data preparation 
The gathered data had been previously cleaned and prepared for analysis before it was 
received by Winning Moves. The data preparation included handling of missing values (i.e., 
999 or 998 entered for missing values). Once data was received, verbatims for ‘other’ 
questions were coded, using SPSS, creating new categories. 
The sample was treated as a random sample representative of people living in the eight 
devolved authorities and was therefore not weighted. 
Data analysis 
The preliminary analysis of the public survey data included both quantitative and qualitative 
components.  
As part of the quantitative analysis, crosstabs were calculated using SPSS to show differences 
between devolved authorities. Charts have been used to present the summarised survey 
results for the key variables of interest to visualise those differences in response. Unless 
otherwise stated, all questions were prompted. 
The qualitative data from open-ended survey questions was coded for recurrent key patterns 
and themes.  
Qualitative data is sometimes presented as frequencies (e.g., responses to the ‘other’ category 
in the question on interest in decisions taken in the regions). Selected quotes have also been 







To understand perceptions of devolved authorities, a survey of businesses’ perceptions was 
conducted. 963 responses were collected in total on the basis of at least 125 responses in 
seven devolved authorities using a sample of businesses from the UK’s Inter-Departmental 
Business Register (IDBR) list (see Table 1).  
The questionnaire was used to explore respondents’:  
 (a) Awareness of Combined Authorities; 
 (b) Civic engagement; and 
 (c) Perceptions of local environment and improvements.  











Valley Cornwall London 
143 131 135 144 140 143 126 
 
The sample frame for this project consisted of a representative sample of local-units listed in 
the Inter-Departmental Business Register (IDBR) by: 
High level 2007 SIC code; and 
Business size indicated by number of employees at the Local Unit. 
For the initial analysis, presented here, the achieved interview sample was treated as 
representative of businesses in the seven devolved authorities studied, and was not therefore 
weighted.  
The sample was however examined to understand how representative businesses interviewed 
are of the IDBR population within each of the seven devolved authorities.  To enable this we 
have grouped businesses into: 
Two size categories: Micro businesses (less than ten employees) and Medium/Large 
businesses (ten or more employees); and 
Four broad industry sectors: Agriculture, Production, Construction and Services. 
The full results of the IDBR sample comparison are included Table 2. In summary: 
• There is slightly greater representation of medium/large businesses within the 
Production, Construction and Services sector; and  
• There is some under-representation of the Agricultural sector.   
 
 
At this stage no weighting has taken place, with the following considerations taken into 
account:  
• For some categories where the population within the IDBR comprises <1% there are 
some Devolved Authorities where no interviews were achieved, given the smaller 
sample size of the survey work and the available sample within the sampling frame and 
so weighting would not enable a complete profile match to the IDBR; and 
• During fieldwork there were a number of IDBR businesses that upon calling reported 
that they were no longer in operation, it follows that some differences in the achieved 




APPENDIX D: EXAMPLES OF MAYORAL 
LEADERSHIP FROM AROUND THE 
WORLD 
Japan 
Japan has a two-tier local government system which is composed of 47 prefectural 
governments and 1,719 municipalities. Both prefectural and municipalities have a directly 
elected head, a Governor for prefectural governments and a Mayor for municipalities, which 
are elected on a four-year term with no term limit.42 They also have local assemblies, 
composed of elected members, which keep the elected head in check and pass local 
ordinances, as well as populate committees in charge of education, policing and elections. 
Mayors have a lot of sway politically in Japan and in some cases turnout for mayoral elections 
top that of national polls. The powers vested in the mayor as political and organisational head 
of the municipality affords them considerable control over the local authority. Mayors are also 
represented in Japan’s partnership structure between national and local government, where 
policies and legislations can be amended at early consultation stage.43 
Governors and Mayors have the right to introduce bills to the local assemblies, they also have 
the exclusive right to submit budget bills and to adjust and implement budgets. Both can also 
impose regulations and penalties regarding public services in their jurisdictions. If the assembly 
and the Mayor or Governor disagrees over budgets or other proposals, the Governor or Mayor 
can force the assembly to reconsider the proposed bill. If the assembly passes a vote of no 
confidence, the Governor or Mayor has the right to dissolve the assembly. Under certain 
circumstances, such as insufficient time to call the assembly into session, a Governor or Mayor 
can bypass the assembly and enact, revise, or abolish a budget or ordinance. In principle, the 
local government is constituted as a dual representative system with powers divided between 
the executive and legislative branches, but in practice, the Japanese system gives governors 
and mayors broad authority to make and implement policy, even in the absence of support 
from the legislative assembly.44 
Local government in Japan provides most public services with central government reserved to 
providing pensions, defence, and other national responsibilities. Specifically, municipalities 
provide a wide range of public and personal services including education (especially 
compulsory education), public health, city planning, fire protection, water and sewerage. In 
addition they provide social services and assistance. Some cities have more authority 
transferred from the central government. 
Local taxation in Japan, which includes a mix of income, asset and consumption strands, 
covered roughly 38% (~£276bn) of a local government spending in 2015. National treasury 
grants are equivalent to Britain’s government grants and are about 15% (~£103bn) of all local 
government spending in Japan. These grants are linked to specific policies and programmes 
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pre-determined share of certain national taxes which provides around 17% (~£116bn) of all 
local government funding – local governments can spend LAT money how it wishes.45 
USA 
In the United States, the majority of power resides at the state level and the states in turn 
devolve powers and responsibilities to cities, counties, and municipalities. 
There are several distinct types of mayors, depending on whether the system of local 
government is council-manager government or mayor-council government. Under the council-
manager government system, the mayor is a first among equals on the city council, which acts 
as a legislative body while executive functions are performed by the appointed manager. The 
mayor may chair the city council but lacks any special legislative powers. The mayor and city 
council serve part-time, with day-to-day administration in the hands of a professional city 
manager.  
Under the mayor-council system, the mayoralty and city council are separate offices. This 
system may be of two types, either a strong mayor system or a weak mayor system. Under the 
strong mayor system, the mayor acts as an elected executive with the city council exercising 
legislative powers. They may select a chief administrative officer to oversee the different 
departments. This is the system used in most of the United States' large cities, primarily 
because mayors serve full-time and have a wide range of services that they oversee. In a 
weak mayor or ceremonial mayor system, the mayor has appointing power for department 
heads but is subject to checks by the city council, sharing both executive and legislative duties 
with the council. 
The power of mayors and councils vary from city to city; in most cities the mayor has limited 
powers and serves largely as a ceremonial leader, but in some cities (particularly large urban 
areas) the council is nominally responsible for formulating city ordinances, which the mayor 
enforces, but the mayor often controls the actions of the council.46 
Formal powers may include executive powers (control over overall strategic direction and 
budgeting, key personnel, and communication); legislative powers (the ability to propose, 
introduce, and enact new laws and policies); fiscal powers (the ability to tax, borrow, lend, and 
charge fees for use and service); and sectoral powers (control over strategy, operations, 
personnel, and budgets in key sectors, such as education, housing, land use, and policing). 
These powers vary from place to place but broadly represent the toolkit of mayors’ formal 
powers.47 
France 
In France the main units of local government, defined by the constitution as collectivités 
territoriales (“territorial collectivities”), are the régions, the départements, the communes, and 








The communes are the smallest unit of democracy in France. Communes have municipal 
councils that are elected for six years, including at least nine members. The council 
administers public land, sets up public undertakings, votes on its own budget, and over recent 
years has played an increasing role in promoting local economic development. It elects a 
mayor and the mayor’s assistants. 
The mayor is both the chief executive of the municipal council and the representative of the 
central government in the commune. The mayor is in charge of the municipal police and 
through them ensures public order, security, and health and guarantees the supervision of 
public places to prevent such things as fires, floods, and epidemics. The mayor also directs 
municipal employees, implements the budget, and is responsible for the registry office.48 Other 
responsibilities include setting local tax rates, local economic development projects, local 
schools, and managing public services. 
Under the authority of a Prefect, the mayor performs administrative functions, including: 
• Publication of laws and regulations; 
• The organization of elections; 
• Validating signatures 
• implementing measures of general safety and special functions  
• In case of emergency the mayor may be required to act to enforce general 
administrative policy to assist state police special forces 
• Officiates in such things as civil marriages 
• Assisting in inquiries into wanted people on their personalities, financial, family, and 
social situations. 
• A civil judicial function 
Italy 
Italy is divided into three levels of local government: regions, provinces and communes 
(municipalities). Communes consist of a popularly elected communal council, the communal 
committee or executive body, and the mayor. The communes have the power to level and 
collect limited local taxes and they have their own police. The communes issue ordinances and 
run certain public health services. Other responsibilities include town planning, building and 
commercial permits, social housing, local public transport and roads, water and waste 
management, education (pre and primary schools buildings), social services, local economic 
development, recreation and culture. 
The mayor represents the municipality both politically and legally and acts as the main 
government official in the functions delegated by the state to the municipality. The mayor 
performs three independent functions: head of the municipality, leader of the majority party (or 
coalition) and government official. The mayor appoints the members of the cabinet, who are 





services and the representatives of the municipality in local quangos and municipal 
corporations. 
In terms of political leadership structures, Italian local government systems are designed to 
give to directly elected mayors’ extensive full powers in many governance and administrative 
issues. They are in charge of executive matters whereas the function of overview and scrutiny 
is delegated to the city council, which also has approval powers on the main administrative 
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APPENDIX E: LOGIC MAPPING OF KEY 
CONCEPTS 









APPENDIX F: SURVEY RESULTS 
The presentation of survey results in each devolved authority 
alongside each other is only for descriptive purposes. Any 
comparison between authorities would not be credible in the 
light of different contexts and structures underpinning these 
devolved institutions, and the relatively small number of 
interviews conducted in each area at this stage. 
Public Survey 
Question 1: 
Before taking this survey, had you heard of any of the terms Combined Authority, Local 
Enterprise Partnership, Local Authority and Chamber of Commerce?   
• As shown in Figure 11, less than half the respondents (46.4%), across all combined 
authority areas, reported that, before taking the survey they were aware of the term 
‘combined authority’; a similar proportion of respondents (45.4%) across all combined 
authority areas also reported that, before taking the survey, they were aware of the term 
‘local enterprise partnership’. Respondents in Tees Valley reported the highest level of 
awareness of the term ‘local enterprise partnership’ (60.1%), while respondents in 
Manchester had the lowest level of awareness (33.7%). 
• Figure 12 shows that respondents in Cornwall reported a relatively high level of 
awareness of the term ‘unitary authority’ (68.6%).  
• The vast majority of respondents (95.9%), across all combined authority areas, reported 
that, before taking the survey, they were aware of the term ‘local authority’ (Figure 13). 
Respondents in Tees Valley reported the highest level of awareness (97.7%), while 
respondents in West Midlands reported the lowest level of awareness (93.7%). 
• Similarly, most respondents (86.2%), across all combined authority areas reported that, 
before taking the survey, they were aware of the term ‘chamber of commerce’. 
Respondents in Cambridge and Peterborough reported the highest level of awareness 
of the term ‘chamber of commerce’ (89.1%), while those in Manchester reported the 
lowest level of awareness (80.7%). 
 
 
Figure 11: Awareness of 'Local Enterprise Partnership' and 'Combined Authority' terms 
 
Figure 12: Awareness of the term 'Unitary Authority' in Cornwall 
 









Question 2:  
You previously said that you had heard of the term 'Combined Authority’ / ‘Unitary 
Authority’. Would you say you know what this term means?  
Nearly three quarters of respondents (72.8%), across all combined authority areas, believed 
that they knew what the term ‘combined authority’ meant. Figure 14 shows that Tees Valley 
had the highest proportion (79.2%) reporting they knew what the term meant. 
 





Question 3:  
Before taking this survey, were you aware that the metro-mayor for your area is << 
name of the metro-mayor>>?  
Nearly three quarters of respondents (72%) across all combined authority areas reported they 
were aware of who the mayor for their area was. Figure 15 indicates that London and 
Manchester respondents reported the highest level of awareness of who their mayor was, 
97.2% and 88% respectively. 
 





Question 4:  
Would you say that in general you are interested in decisions taken in your region for…  
Respondents in the majority of combined authority areas showed the greatest interest (i.e., 
answered either ‘moderately interested’ or ‘a lot’) in decisions for health and the environment.  





Interest for specific policy areas varied by area: 
• Transport: Respondents in London reported the highest interest in decisions for 
transport (81.7%). 
• The environment: Respondents in Cornwall and London reported the highest interest in 
decisions for the environment, 75.7% and 74.5% respectively. 
• Housing: Respondents in Cornwall and London reported the highest interest in 
decisions for housing, 72% and 72.2% respectively.  
 
 
• Health: Respondents in Cornwall reported the highest interest in decisions for health, 
84.3%. 
• Air Quality: Respondents in London reported the highest interest in decisions for air 
quality. 
• High street: Respondents in Cornwall reported the highest interest in decisions for high 
street (71.7%).  
• Crime Policing: Respondents in Cornwall and London reported the highest interest in 
decisions for policing, 75.9% and 75.1% respectively.   
• Planning: Respondents in Cornwall reported the highest interest in decisions for 
planning (77.7%).  
• Education: Respondents were asked about how interested they were in decision for 
education taken in their area. Respondents in London and Liverpool reported the 




Question 5:  
Have you looked at any of the following produced by your Combined Authority? 
The majority of respondents (ranging from 55% to 70.3%) in all areas reported no engagement 
with information resources produced by their combined authority, except in Cornwall, where a 
lower proportion of respondents (33.4%) reported no engagement with those resources.  In 
terms of specific resources accessed: 
• Content on their web page: Respondents in Cornwall reported the highest 
engagement with content on a web page produced by their combined authority (57.1%), 
followed by those in London (18.1%). 
• Content on their social media accounts: The highest engagement with a social 
media channel produced by their combined authority was reported by respondents in 
Tees Valley (at 23.5%). 
• Published council meeting minutes or meeting webcast: The highest engagement 
with published council meeting minutes (or meeting webcast) produced by their 
combined authority was reported by respondents in Cornwall (at 19.4%). 
• Strategy documents: The highest engagement with strategy documents produced by 
their combined authority was reported by respondents in Cornwall (26.1%). 
• Business case for the airport (Tees Valley only): Engagement with the business 









Question 6:  
Have you ever attended any public meetings for your Council/Combined Authority? 
Most general public respondents (91%) in all combined authority areas reported not having 
ever attended any public meetings for their combined authority, and only few respondents (6%) 
reported having attended at least one meeting. As shown in Figure 18, the proportion of 
respondents reporting having attended any public meeting for their combined authority was the 
highest in Cornwall (17.2%).  





Question 7:  
Are you aware of any of the following projects?   
Devolved authorities participating in the surveys identified the projects in their area to be 
included in this question, and their responses are summarised in Figure 19.  
Figure 19: Awareness of Key Regional Projects 
 
• In Cornwall: 
o Cornwall Devolution Deal – around a third of respondents (28.9%) reported being 
aware of the Cornwall Devolution Deal. 
o Climate Emergency Declaration – over one third of respondents (39.1%) reported 
being aware of the Climate Emergency Declaration. 
• In Tees Valley: 
o Purchase of Durham Tees Valley Airport – the vast majority of respondents 
(89.8%) reported being aware of the Purchase of Durham Tees Valley Airport 
project. 
o SSI Taskforce – two thirds of respondents (66.1%) reported being aware of the 
SSI Taskforce project. 
o Enjoy Tees Valley – around a quarter (23.3%) reported being aware of the Enjoy 
Tees Valley project.  
• In Cambridgeshire and Peterborough: 
o Cambridge Autonomous Metro – nearly half the respondents (47.1%) reported 
being aware of the Cambridge Autonomous Metro project. 
o Peterborough University – one quarter of respondents (27.3%) reported being 






Question 8:  
Do you think this project was/is needed in the area?  
Responses are presented in Figure 20 and more detail and comments are provided below. 
Figure 20: Perceived Need For Key Regional Projects 
 
In Cornwall: 
• Cornwall Devolution Deal – under half the respondents (44.5%) perceived the Cornwall 
Devolution Deal as necessary in the area; over one third of them (37.7%) perceived the 
deal as unnecessary; and the remaining did not know. Comments provided are also 
presented below. 
“Yes, it is needed, but not on the central government terms. Cornwall Council 
ought to be able to take decisions on planning and local taxation, such as a 
tourist tax, to move the county forward”. 
 “I think Cornwall should be considered as a separate place as it is so remote 
from big cities like London and Bristol. The smaller communities have different 
issues to other places around the country so it makes sense for us to set our own 
rules”.  
 “Devolution is yet another way for the Central government to ‘pass the buck’ 
having already slashed funding to unmanageable levels”.  
 “It’s pretty pointless as it includes so little additional power/freedoms and no new 
funding”. 
• Climate Emergency Declaration - the majority of respondents (71.2%) perceived the 
Climate Emergency Declaration as necessary in the area; around one quarter (22.2%) 
perceived the declaration as unnecessary; and the remaining did not know. 
 “We are facing a climate emergency and each region should take any possible 
action to mitigate/remedy this. Considering the woeful lack of interest and action 
 
 
from central government, the actions of local government become all the more 
important”. 
 “Cornwall is very badly served by public transport and as a result we have heavy 
traffic through villages making for poor air quality”.  
 “Cornwall Council won't stop destroying the environment and allowing building 
on green field sites. It's just green washing and an excuse to spend taxpayers 
money on consultants and vanity projects”.  
In Tees Valley: 
• Purchase of Durham Tees Valley Airport - most respondents (83.2%) perceived the 
Purchase of Durham Tees Valley Airport project as necessary in the area, while only a 
few respondents (9.6%) reported perceiving the purchase as unnecessary. Some 
additional comments that were provided by the survey respondents are presented 
below. 
“The airport is in reasonable distance and much easier to get to. If They grow 
their flight offerings I think this will bring jobs and make it much easier to go on 
holiday rather than travelling and parking at least an hour and 20 minutes away at 
Newcastle”.  
“Having an airport will help attract much needed investment and jobs to the 
region. Freight/cargo air services and business flights are also very important for 
local companies to reduce travel and transport costs. Existing companies in the 
area, Hitachi, Cummins, Cleveland Bridge and Amazon’s distribution centre, will 
no longer have to use Newcastle or Leeds airports. This will decrease the use of 
HGV vehicle journeys, cut costs, attract more businesses to the area and aid our 
local economy.” 
“I do not believe the airport is sustainable given the population, Brexit and 
environmental pressures. Leeds-Bradford and Newcastle are close and 
established airports”.  
• SSI Taskforce - most general public respondents (85.5%) perceived the SSI Taskforce 
as necessary in the area, while only few of them (3.6%) stated that this was 
unnecessary. As stated by one respondent: 
“So many people were out of work and suffering because of the closure that 
something was needed to help them all”. 
• Enjoy Tees Valley - the majority of respondents (69.7%) stated that the Enjoy Tees 
Valley project was necessary in the area, while only a few of the respondents (3.4%) 
reported that the project was unnecessary. 
“Tees Valley offers fantastic natural resources, such as national parks, forests, 
seaside and coast towns”.  
“I think Teesside has a really negative image, nationally, and its facilities and 
resources are overlooked, even by many people who live here. Local pride and 
self-esteem is diminishing and anything that raises those things is a good thing”.  
In Cambridgeshire and Peterborough:  
 
 
• Cambridge Autonomous Metro – just over half the respondents (52.3%) reported that 
the Cambridge Autonomous Metro project was necessary in the area, while nearly one 
of third of them (31.1%) reported that the project was unnecessary (the rest did not 
know). Some additional comments that were provided by the survey respondents are 
presented below. 
“Traffic in Cambridge is ridiculous at rush hour. It takes 40 minutes to drive to 
work by car (not that I do it regularly), but the same journey is 20 mins on a bike. 
Something positive needs to be done for Cambridge”. 
“Cambridge has always been poorly served by public transport and yet continues 
to maintain huge car parks in the City Centre. Anything that helps reduce 
congestion and pollution in the City needs further investigation and backing”. 
“An underground system built in Cambridge would be enormously expensive. The 
construction would be too disruptive and, possibly endanger historic buildings. I 
think clever traffic management, with a few additions, could improve things in 
Cambridge instead”.  
• Peterborough University – just under two thirds of respondents (60.7%) reported that 
the Peterborough University project was necessary in the area, while one quarter of 
them (26.4%) reported that the project was unnecessary.  Some comments provided by 
the survey respondents are also presented below. 
“Peterborough needs an influx of young intelligent people from across the country 
to enhance cultural social and music events. The profile of the city will be raised 
and the demographic will change for the better”. 
“University credibility is in decline because of the change in ethos of the university 
governing bodies. They are no longer seen as places of higher learning but as 
money-making establishments that have lowered the entry threshold to gain more 
fee paying students, the majority of whom now nearly always get a first. The entry 
and exit qualifications need a national review and a single standard as degrees 




Question 9:  
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? Respondents 
were asked to agree or disagree with the following statements: 
• People have control over decisions made 
• People are clear who is responsible for leadership 
• People know who to hold accountable for decisions made 
• The views of people are represented in local decision making 
• People have a say on how local budgets are spent 
• The area has a strong representation in central government 
• Too many policy decisions affecting my area are made outside it 
Responses are summarised below and depicted in Figure 21. 
“Too many policy decisions affecting my area are made outside it”: Respondents 
in Cornwall showed the highest agreement with the statement (64.3%). 
“People have control over decisions made”: Respondents in London showed the 
highest agreement (i.e. answered either ‘somewhat agree’ or ‘strongly agree’) 
with the statement (14.5%). 
“People are clear who is responsible for leadership”: Respondents in London 
showed the highest agreement with the statement (29.4%). 
“People know who to hold accountable for decisions made”: Respondents in 
Cornwall showed the highest agreement with the statement (24.2%). 
“The views of people are represented in local decision making”: Respondents in 
London showed the highest agreement with the statement (20.1%) 
“People have a say on how local budgets are spent”: Respondents in London 
showed the highest agreement with the statement (11.8%). 
“The area has a strong representation in central government”: Respondents in 
London showed the highest agreement with the statement (27.7%). 
 
 








Question 10:  
Before taking this survey, had you heard of any of the terms Combined Authority, Local 
Enterprise Partnership, Local Authority and Chamber of Commerce?   
 
 
• The majority of business respondents across all combined authority areas reported that, 
before taking the survey, they were aware of the term ‘local enterprise partnership’ 
(Figure 22). Respondents in Cambridgeshire and Peterborough (69.9%) reported the 
highest level of awareness of the term ‘local enterprise partnership’. 
• Respondents in Tees Valley (57.1%), reported the highest level of awareness of the 
term ‘combined authority’, followed by those in Cornwall (55.2% – Figure 22).  
• Most respondents across all combined authority areas also reported that they were 
aware of the term ‘local authority’ before taking the survey. Respondents in Tees Valley 
reported the highest level of awareness of the term ‘local authority’ (97.9%). Most 
respondents across all combined authority areas also reported that they were aware of 
the term ‘chamber of commerce’. Respondents in West Midlands reported the highest 
level of awareness of the term ‘chamber of commerce’ (95.1%). 
Figure 22: Awareness of 'Local Enterprise Partnership' and 'Combined Authority' Terms 
 









Question 11:  
You previously said that you had heard of the term 'Combined Authority’ / ‘Unitary 
Authority’. Would you say you know what this term means?  
Around two thirds of business respondents (67.7%) across all combined authority areas 
believed they knew what the term ‘combined authority’ meant – with the highest proportion in 
Tees Valley (73.8%) and Greater Manchester (72.1%). 





Question 12:  
Before taking this survey, were you aware that the metro-mayor for your area is << 
name of the metro-mayor>>?  
Two thirds (65.7%) of business respondents across all combined authority areas reported they 
were aware of who their metro-mayor was. London and Manchester respondents reported the 
highest level of awareness, at 95.2% and 81.7%, respectively.  





Question 13:  
Would you say that in general you are interested in decisions taken in your region 
for…? 
Business respondents in the majority of combined authority areas showed the greatest interest 
(i.e., answered either ‘moderately interested’ or ‘a lot’) in decisions for health, crime policing 
and business rates. 
Interest for specific policy areas varied by area (Figure 27): 
• Health: Respondents in London and Cornwall reported the highest interest in decisions 
for health taken in their area, at 83.3% and 82.5% respectively.  
• Crime Policing: Respondents in London and Manchester reported the highest interest in 
decisions for crime policing taken in their area, at 86.5% and 80.1% respectively. 
• Transport: Respondents in London and Liverpool reported the highest interest in 
decisions for transport taken in their area, at 78.6% and 60.8% respectively. 
• Business Rates: Respondents in Cornwall and Tees Valley reported the highest interest 
in decisions for business rates taken in their area, at 69.9% and 64.2% respectively. 
• Trade: Respondents in Cornwall and Tees Valley reported the highest interest in 
decisions for trade taken in their area, at 69.9% and 64.2% respectively. 
• Air Quality and the Environment: Respondents in London and Cornwall reported the 
highest interest in decisions for air quality and the environment taken in their area, at 
69.9% and 64.2% respectively. 
• Education: Respondents in London and Manchester reported the highest interest in 
decisions for education taken in their area, at 66.7 and 66.4% respectively.  
• Housing: Respondents in Cornwall and London reported the highest interest in 
decisions for housing taken in their area, at 59.5% and 55.5% respectively. 
• (Physical) Space for expansion and development: Respondents in Liverpool and 
Cornwall reported the highest interest in decisions for (physical) space for expansion 
and development taken in their area, at 48.9% and 46.2% respectively. 
• Skills and Workforce Development issues: Business respondents in Liverpool reported 
the highest interest (48.1%). 
 
 









Question 14:   
Have you looked at any of the following produced by your Combined Authority?  
Devolved authorities participating in the surveys identified the projects in their area to be 
included in this question. 
The majority of business respondents in all areas (ranging from 55% to 79.3%) reported no 
engagement with information resources produced by their combined authority, except in 
Cornwall, where a lower proportion (32.9%) reported no engagement with those resources. In 
terms of specific resources accessed (see Figure 28): 
• Web page: Respondents in Cornwall reported the highest engagement with a web page 
produced by their combined authority (60.1%). 
• Social media channel: The highest engagement with a social media channel produced 
by their combined authority was reported by respondents in Cornwall (19.6%), followed 
by respondents in Tees Valley (16.4%). 
• Published council meeting minutes or meeting webcast: The highest engagement with 
published council meeting minutes (or meeting webcast) produced by their combined 
authority was reported by respondents in Cornwall (18.9%), followed by those in 
Cambridgeshire and Peterborough (14.7%). 
• Strategy documents: The highest engagement with strategy documents produced by 
their combined authority was reported by respondents in Cornwall (25.2%), followed by 
those in Manchester (16.8%). 
• Business case for the airport (Tees Valley only): Engagement with the business case for 
the airport was reported by a quarter of business respondents (27.1%) in Tees Valley.  








Question 15:  
Have you ever personally attended any public meetings for your Council/Combined 
Authority? 
As shown in Figure 29, most business respondents (90.7%) in all combined authority areas 
reported not having ever attended any public meetings for their combined authority. The 
proportion of respondents reporting having attended any public meeting for their combined 
authority was the highest in Cornwall (15.4%).  





Question 16:  
Are you aware of any of the following projects?   
Devolved authorities participating in the surveys identified the projects in their area to be 
included in this question. Responses are summarised in Figure 30, and more feedback is 
provided below. 
Figure 30: Awareness of Key Regional Projects 
 
In Cornwall: 
• Cornwall Devolution Deal. One in five business respondents (21.7%) reported being 
aware of the Cornwall Devolution Deal, while the majority of respondents (76.9%) 
reported not being aware of the deal. 
• Climate Emergency Declaration. Over one third of respondents (37.8%) reported being 
aware of the Climate Emergency Declaration, while the majority of respondents (62.2%) 
reported being unaware of the declaration. 
In Tees Valley:  
• Purchase of Durham Tees Valley Airport. Most businesses (90.7%) reported being 
aware of the Purchase of Durham Tees Valley Airport project, while only a few 
respondents (8.6%) reported being unaware of the purchase. 
• SSI Taskforce. Approximately two thirds of businesses (67.9%) reported being aware of 
the SSI Taskforce project, while nearly one third of them (31.4%) reported being 
unaware of the project.  
• Enjoy Tees Valley. One in five businesses (21.4%) reported being aware of the Enjoy 
Tees Valley project – the majority respondents (77.9%) were unaware of the project. 
In Cambridgeshire and Peterborough: 
 
 
• Cambridge Autonomous Metro. A quarter of businesses (25.9%) reported being aware 
of the Cambridge Autonomous Metro project, with nearly three quarters (74.1%) 
reporting being unaware of the project.  
• Peterborough University. Over one third of business respondents (38.5%) reported 
being aware of the Peterborough University project, with two thirds (61.5%) reporting 




Question 17:  
Do you think this project was/is needed in the area?  
Responses are summarised in Figure 31 and more detail and comments are provided below. 
Figure 31: Perceived Need for Key Regional Projects 
 
In Cornwall: 
• Cornwall Devolution Deal – over a third (38.7%) of businesses reported that the 
Cornwall Devolution Deal was necessary in the area. As stated by one respondent:  
“Needed as it’s a very poor area and the wages are very low, little transport, policing 
and healthcare”. A relatively large proportion of businesses, however (29%), did not 
know whether this was necessary or not.  
• Climate Emergency Declaration - nearly two thirds of respondents (63%) reported that 
the Climate Emergency Declaration was necessary in the area. Some additional 
comments are also listed below. 
“Needed to protect the climate and for ecological reasons”. 
“Where we live is a very special place for its environment and coastline, nature 
etc. so very much needed in Cornwall”. 
“Because they have reached a crisis point of climate change and something 
needs to be done”. 
In Tees Valley:  
• Purchase of Durham Tees Valley Airport – most businesses (89.8%) perceived the 
Purchase of Durham Tees Valley Airport project as necessary in the area, with only a 
few respondents (7.1%) perceiving the purchase as unnecessary. In comparison with 
the general public, business appeared relatively more positive about the airport. Specific 
feedback was provided by some businesses and this is listed below: 
 
 
“The whole area needs a boost, with the airport and the development of the old 
SSI site. More people in the region and more jobs can take the area out of the 
downward spiral it is in”. 
“Crucial in the area as people can travel directly instead of going towards 
Newcastle and Leeds and have to travel by car in order to get to the Tees Valley 
area”. 
“The project would bring all sorts to the area. There would be more tourism, travel 
for trade, easier for people to travel for business and more employment”. 
• SSI Taskforce – over two thirds of respondents (68.4%) stated that the SSI Taskforce 
has been necessary and nearly one in five (22.1%) reported that this was unnecessary. 
In comparison, 85.5% of public respondents stated that the SSI Taskforce was 
necessary. Additional comments provided by some businesses are listed below. 
“It was a major employment source and some alternative employment 
opportunities need to come from it”. 
“Just for the prosperity of the region”. 
“Vital that something was done with the steelworks”. 
• Enjoy Tees Valley. The majority of respondents (73.3%) reported perceiving the Enjoy 
Tees Valley project as necessary in the area, while over one fourth of respondents 
(26.7%) reported perceiving the project as unnecessary. Additional comments included 
the following: 
“It will help the economy by bringing in more people and helping with tourism”.  
“I think it's highlighting what's available to those from outside the area”.  
In Cambridgeshire and Peterborough: 
• Cambridge Autonomous Metro. Over two thirds of business respondents (67.6%) 
reported that the Cambridge Autonomous Metro project was necessary for the area 
(compared with 52.3% of the public that considered this necessary); 18.9% of business 
respondents perceived this as an unnecessary project (compared with 31.1% of the 
public). Additional comments for and against the project are also provided below.  
“To ease the traffic congestion”. 
“A lot more could be done before building an underground system. Going into the 
ground leads to unforeseen events which can increase costs beyond 
expectations”. 
• Peterborough University. Nearly two thirds of respondents (65.5%) perceived the 
Peterborough University project as necessary in the area, while only a few of them 
(10.9%) perceived it the project as unnecessary (this latter figure compares with 26.4% 
among the general public respondents). Additional comments by businesses are 
provided below. 
“In an expanding borough, higher education is necessary”. 
 
 
“Definitely needed in the area, and it will improve the local economy and produce 




Question 18:  
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?   
Respondents were asked to agree or disagree with the following statements: 
• Businesses have control over decisions made within the region 
• Businesses are clear who is responsible for leadership within the region 
• Businesses know who to hold accountable for decisions made within the region 
• The views of businesses are represented in local decision making within the region 
• Businesses have a say on how local budgets are spent within the region 
• Too many policy decisions affecting businesses are made outside the region 
Figure 32 summarises responses provided by businesses on these issues and more 
information is also provided below. 
Businesses in Manchester showed the highest level of agreement (i.e., answered either 
‘somewhat agree’ or ‘strongly agree’) with the statement (26%):  
‘Businesses have control over decisions made within the region’ 
 
Respondents in Manchester reported the highest agreement with the statement (47.4%): 
‘Businesses are clear who is responsible for leadership within the region’  
 
Respondents in Manchester expressed the highest agreement with this statement (42.7%): 
‘Businesses know who to hold accountable for decisions made within the region’  
 
Respondents in London reported the highest agreement with the statement (32.6%): 
‘The views of businesses are represented in local decision making within the region’.  
 
Agreement with this statement dropped to around 15%–20%. Respondents in Manchester 
reported the highest agreement with the statement (22.1%): 
‘Businesses have a say on how local budgets are spent within the region’.  
 
Those in both Manchester and Tees Valley reported the highest agreement with the statement 
(67.9% for both combined authorities): 
 
 
‘Too many policy decisions affecting businesses are made outside the region’.  










To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements:  
‘The area has strong representation in central government’ – relatively more businesses in 
London showed agreement with this statement (i.e. answered either ‘somewhat agree’ or 
‘strongly agree’) (25.4%). 
‘The area provides a lot of support for businesses’ – relatively more business in Liverpool 
expressed agreement (34%) with the statement. 
‘The area has funding available for business support programmes’ – relatively more 
businesses in Cornwall agreed with this the statement (30.8%). 
‘The area is well connected/offers good transport’ – relatively more respondents in London 
agreed with this the statement (96%), while the lowest level of agreement was at 44.8% in 
Cornwall. 
<< Statements and responses summarised below and in Figure 33 >>. 
Figure 33: Perceptions of the Local Environment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
